Florida State University Law Review
Volume 37

Issue 1

Article 1

2009

Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of Mandatory
Interventions in Domestic Violence Cases
Leigh Goodmark
1@12.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of Mandatory Interventions in
Domestic Violence Cases, 37 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. (2009) .
https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol37/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida State University Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact efarrell@law.fsu.edu.

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY
LAW REVIEW

AUTONOMY FEMINISM:
AN ANTI-ESSENTIALIST CRITIQUE OF MANDATORY
INTERVENTIONS IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES
Leigh Goodmark

VOLUME 37

FALL 2009

NUMBER 1

Recommended citation: Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist
Critique of Mandatory Interventions in Domestic Violence Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1
(2009).

AUTONOMY FEMINISM: AN ANTI-ESSENTIALIST
CRITIQUE OF MANDATORY INTERVENTIONS IN
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES
LEIGH GOODMARK*
ABSTRACT
In the 1970s and 80s, feminists led the way in crafting and advocating for
laws and policies to address domestic violence in the United States—and
those feminists got it wrong. Desperate to find some way to force police to
treat assaults against spouses as they would strangers, the battered women’s
movement seized on the idea of mandatory arrest—relieving police of discretion and requiring them to make arrests whenever probable cause existed.
But mandatory arrest also removed discretion from the women that the policy
purported to serve—a trend that has come to characterize domestic violence
law and policy. Later policy choices, like no-drop prosecution and bans on
mediating in domestic violence cases, are similarly marked by their denial of
decisionmaking to women who have been battered. Domestic violence law and
policy prioritizes the goals of policymakers and battered women’s advocates—
safety and batterer accountability—over the goals of individual women looking for a way to address the violence in their relationships. The shift of decisionmaking authority has profoundly negative implications for the autonomy
of women who have been battered and reflects the influence of dominance feminism on the battered women’s movement. This Article argues that the time
has come to shift the lens through which we view domestic violence law and
policy from dominance feminism to anti-essentialist feminism, allowing us to
see how problematic mandatory policies are and helping us to craft domestic
violence law and policy that honors the goals and priorities of women who
have been battered.
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................
II. MANDATORY POLICIES IN THE CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LEGAL SYSTEMS ...............
A. Mandatory Arrest and No-Drop Prosecution .............................................
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I. INTRODUCTION
June 10, 1983. Charles Thurman hands police officers a knife
dripping with his wife’s blood.1 Then, as the officers look on, he kicks
her in the head—and he is still not arrested.2 After months of phone
calls and reports to police warning of Charles Thurman’s violence
and repeated threats against his wife, and after a criminal conviction
and a civil order both required Thurman to stay away from his wife,
Charles Thurman was still able to stab his wife multiple times in the
chest, neck, and throat, drop their son on top of her while she bled,
and kick her repeatedly in the head.3 Thurman’s vicious attack on his
wife was facilitated by the Torrington, Connecticut police department’s unwillingness to respond to numerous requests for assistance
for Tracey Thurman and her son, Charles Jr.—inaction that continued after the stabbing. Charles Thurman was not arrested, in fact,
until he again approached his wife while she was lying on a stretcher, waiting to be taken for medical treatment.4
Tracey Thurman and her son sued the Torrington Police Department for its failure to intervene on their behalf and received $2.3 million in damages.5 The landmark suit not only provided Tracey and
Charles Jr. with some small measure of compensation for their suffering (Tracey Thurman remains partially paralyzed and permanently scarred from that attack)6 but, in conjunction with the settlement
of lawsuits filed in Oakland, California, and New York City protesting the lack of police response to domestic violence calls,7 began a policy revolution.
This revolution was designed to ensure that police could no longer
ignore the pleas of women who had been battered8 simply because
1. James B. Halsted, Domestic Violence: Its Legal Definitions, in DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE: THE CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 143, 158 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl
G. Buzawa eds., 1992).
2. Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1526 (D. Conn. 1984).
3. Id. at 1524-26.
4. Id. at 1526.
5. Anne Sparks, Feminists Negotiate the Executive Branch: The Policing of Male Violence, in FEMINISTS NEGOTIATE THE STATE: THE POLITICS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 35, 42
(Cynthia R. Daniels et al. eds., 1997).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 41.
8. A woman who has been battered is not necessarily a victim, a survivor, or a battered woman, though she may be any or all of these at various times. These terms—victim,
survivor, battered woman—have all been used to describe the women who are the subject
of this Article, and all are limited. Victim conjures up visions of a stereotype, a passive,
meek, cowering woman consistent with the early domestic violence literature. Survivor, a
term intended to cast off that stereotype and instead portray women as active agents
struggling against their oppressors to ensure their own survival, is similarly limited; not
all women do, in fact, survive domestic violence, and not all women take action on their
own behalf (however inclusive that term might be intended to be). The term battered woman is problematic because it reduces the woman to her experience of violence. A woman so
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their assailants were their husbands. Throughout the country, either
legislatures imposed or police departments implemented policies requiring arrests in domestic violence cases whenever police had probable cause to do so, ending the era of unfettered police discretion in
determining whether individual incidents of domestic violence should
be classified as crimes. Although Oregon passed the first such law in
1977,9 few jurisdictions followed suit prior to 1983. After Thurman
demonstrated the potential for crippling judgments based on police
inaction, other jurisdictions quickly imposed such policies on law enforcement.10 No longer were police officers permitted to advise abusive men to take a walk around the block, allowing them to return
to torment their victims whenever they pleased. Instead, these attacks on their wives would be treated as seriously as if they had assaulted strangers. Advocates for women who had been battered
hailed these policies, known as “mandatory arrest” laws, as a victory
for every woman who had begged for police protection from her abuser to no avail.
Mandatory arrest policies were attractive because they deprived
individual officers of the discretion to decide whether or not to treat a
batterer’s violence as a crime.11 But police officers were not the only
ones to lose some measure of control with the inception of mandatory
arrests. In a mandatory arrest regime, no party to the incident—
abuser, officer, or victim—has the ability to preempt the involvement
of the criminal system once the officer decides that he has probable
cause to make an arrest. No longer could women who had been battered ask that their abusers not be taken into custody, regardless of
described can be understood only within the context of the violence in her relationship; she
has no existence independent of that one facet of her life. All of these terms reflect the
same type of reductionism that plagues so much of domestic violence law and policy; they
assume that all women are the same, that they all experience violence in the same way,
and that the violence defines them entirely and in so doing shapes what their responses to
that violence should be. BELL HOOKS, TALKING BACK: THINKING FEMINIST, THINKING
BLACK 87-88 (1989). Using the term “women who have been battered,” by contrast, is intended to call attention to the circumstances that they have faced without describing these
women solely as a product of those circumstances, defining the action rather than the
woman herself. This construction is intended to provide the freedom within which to see
women who have been battered as individuals, with different values, capacities, goals, and
visions for their future and to suggest principles for policymaking consistent with this conception. This Article will refer to the “battered women’s movement,” however, in part because the movement self-identifies using that term, and in part because the use of that
term highlights some of the problems within the movement that the Article seeks to address. Moreover, the language in quotations referring to “battered women” has not
been changed.
9. Id. at 42.
10. Halsted, supra note 1, at 158.
11. Eve S. Buzawa, Thomas L. Austin, James Bannon & James Jackson, Role of Victim Preference in Determining Police Response to Victims of Domestic Violence, in
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 255, 267 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1992).
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the reason for the request.12 A call to the police would now trigger a
series of events leading directly to the arrest of the batterer, irrespective of whether his victim saw that as a desirable outcome. Mandatory arrest brought greater protection for many women, but at a sizable
cost—the freedom of individual women to decide whether they
wanted to be involved in the criminal justice system at all.
Mandatory arrest is not the only domestic violence policy that
gave protection to women who had been abused with one hand, but
took their freedom to choose with the other. Both the criminal and
civil laws that address domestic violence enforce policies that purport
to protect women by removing not only the system’s ability to choose
to protect, but also the woman’s ability to decline the state’s protection or intervention. The autonomy of women who have been battered
is the price of these policies. This Article asks whether that has been
too high a price to pay.
The answer to that question depends, in part, on the goals of the
legal intervention. In her article Arrest: What’s the Big Deal, Barbara
Hart, one of the founders of the legal arm of the battered women’s
movement, set out six goals by which legal system interventions
should be measured. First and foremost, she argues, is safety for
women who have been battered and their children.13 Safety is followed by stopping the violence, holding perpetrators accountable, divesting perpetrators of control, restoring women who have been battered, and enhancing agency in women who have been battered.14
Making safety the primary goal of legal interventions is intuitively
appealing and explains policies like mandatory arrest. But the goals
of advocates, policymakers, and system actors might differ from those
of women who have been battered. The problem with policies like
mandatory arrest is that they reify two goals—safety and perpetrator
accountability—and marginalize autonomy, serving women who
share the goals of the system but disenfranchising those with divergent goals.
The prioritization of safety and accountability over autonomy is
consistent with the school of feminist thought that has colored a
great deal of domestic violence theory and policymaking—dominance
feminism. Dominance feminism focuses on women’s subordinated
and victimized status and argues that the legal system can best serve
those victims of violence by enforcing policies that ensure safety, re-

12. Id. (arguing that a consequence of mandatory arrest is the removal of victim discretion).
13. Barbara J. Hart, Arrest: What’s the Big Deal, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 207,
207 (1997) (arguing that “[e]very intervention should be measured against the yardstick of
safety”).
14. Id. at 207-09.

2009]

AUTONOMY FEMINISM

5

gardless of what an individual woman’s preference might be.15 What
dominance feminism ignores, however, is both the diversity of women
who have been battered and the choices available to those women,
opting instead for a narrow version of “victim” that suggests the inability to act rationally on one’s own behalf and justifies mandatory
policies. The emergence of anti-essentialism as a powerful critique of
the dominance feminists’ tendency to group all women—particularly
all women who have been battered—within the “victim” category
provides a different context for examining mandatory policies. Antiessentialism requires us to delve into the complexities of the lives of
individual women who have been battered, rather than considering
women who have been battered collectively. Changing the lens in this
way makes it apparent that mandatory policies are deeply problematic
because they deprive individual women of the self-determination and
self-direction that are essential for autonomy and empowerment.
This Article will begin by considering the arguments supporting
mandatory policies in cases involving domestic violence in the criminal and civil legal systems. The focus in the criminal system will be
on mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution;16 on the civil side, this
Article explores bans on mediating family law cases involving domestic violence. The Article will then define autonomy and explore
whether women who have been battered are capable of exercising autonomy. It will explicitly link the concepts of autonomy and empowerment—central goals of the battered women’s movement. Finally,
the Article will argue that mandatory policies are disempowering
for women who have been battered and, by employing antiessentialist feminist theory, urge that policymakers and advocates
for women who have been battered oppose policies that undermine
women’s autonomy.
II. MANDATORY POLICIES IN THE CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LEGAL
SYSTEMS
A. Mandatory Arrest and No-Drop Prosecution
In the criminal system, the best examples of policy initiatives that
deprive women who have been battered of meaningful choices are
mandatory arrest laws and “no-drop” prosecution policies. As briefly
15. G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and
the Conservatization of the Battered Women’s Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237, 250 (2005).
16. A number of states have also passed laws requiring the imposition of an order forbidding contact with the victim in a pending criminal case, often without providing an opportunity for the victim to express a position. See Nichole Miras Mordini, Mandatory State
Interventions for Domestic Abuse Cases: An Examination of the Effects on Victim Safety
and Autonomy, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 295, 322 (2004). Those types of laws have problems similar to the ones considered in this Article but will not be discussed in detail here.
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discussed above, mandatory arrest policies deprive individual officers
of discretion in deciding whether to arrest a perpetrator for domestic
violence. Instead, mandatory arrest laws require the officer to make
an arrest whenever the officer has probable cause to believe that an
act of domestic violence has been committed.17 Mandatory arrest laws
were thought to solve the “Charles Thurman” problem—the perpetrator who gets warning after warning from police but is never arrested,
and who, as a result, feels secure in his ability to continue to harass,
threaten, and abuse his partner free from state sanction. Frustrated
with years of police inaction in the face of severe violence,18 advocates
for women who had been battered saw police discretion as a crucial
weakness in the criminal justice system, particularly because police
were trained to use that discretion to avoid arrest whenever possible.19 Remove the discretion, the thinking went, and domestic violence would be treated just as seriously as any other crime. Moreover, mandatory arrest laws would prevent police from citing discretion when choosing to credit the stories of abusers who said that their
wives were simply overwrought, when ordering women who had been
battered to leave their own homes, or when blaming the victim for
provoking the attack.20
Mandatory arrest laws were thought to serve as a deterrent to individual abusers, sending the message that domestic violence was
criminal activity warranting the intervention of the justice system.21
No longer would men be able to beat their wives with impunity; they
would now have to consider whether the beating was worth the consequences they could face. These laws would give women who had
been battered a respite from the abuse without requiring them to affirm that they wanted to pursue charges, eliminating the potential
for pressure and coercion by abusers regarding the decision about
whether to arrest.22
17. Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970-1990, 83
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 63 (1992).
18. See Halsted, supra note 1, at 155. But see Marvin Zalman, The Courts’ Response to
Police Intervention in Domestic Violence, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CHANGING CRIMINAL
JUSTICE RESPONSE 79, 85 (Eve S. Buzawa and Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1992) (arguing that
research does not support the idea that the police intervene less aggressively in cases involving intimate partners).
19. Zorza, supra note 17, at 47-49 (citing to police training manuals from Oakland,
California, and Michigan that discouraged officers from making arrests in cases involving
domestic violence); see also SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS
AND STRUGGLES OF THE BATTERED WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 158-59 (1982) (quoting James
Bannon, Commander of the Detroit Police Department).
20. Zorza, supra note 17, at 50.
21. Amy Eppler, Battered Women and the Equal Protection Clause: Will the Constitution Help Them When the Police Won’t?, 95 YALE L.J. 788, 808 (1986).
22. Kathleen J. Ferraro & Lucille Pope, Irreconcilable Differences: Battered Women,
Police, and the Law, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO WIFE ASSAULT 96, 115 (N. Zoe Hilton ed.,
1993); Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of Domes-
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On a societal level, proponents believed mandatory arrest laws
would remove domestic violence from the privacy of the home and
subject it to the harsh light of community scrutiny.23 Before the battered women’s movement began to publicly characterize attacks on
married women as criminal assaults, abuse of one’s wife was widely
viewed as a husband’s prerogative.24 State authorities were inclined
to ignore such acts as beyond the province of the state, regardless of
the injury inflicted on the victim or her pleas for assistance.25 As law
professor Elizabeth Schneider writes of that time, “Privacy says that
violence against women is immune from sanction, that it is permitted, acceptable and part of the basic fabric of American family life.
Privacy says that what goes on in the violent relationship should not
be the subject of state or community intervention.”26 Advocates for
women who had been battered fought to expose the violence that occurred in private and to ensure that intimate partner violence was
treated and penalized just as violence between strangers would have
been. The shift from private to public resolution of domestic violence
reflected the belief that women who had been battered wanted domestic violence to be brought into the public sphere and that they
would welcome state intervention and protection.27 Mandatory arrest
laws were an important step in that direction. Confronted with the
costly results of unfettered police discretion—the successful lawsuits
in Connecticut, California, and New York—convincing state legislatures to pass such laws was easy compared with earlier legislative initiatives on behalf of women who had been battered.28
Historically, police officers were unable to make arrests without
warrants in misdemeanor cases unless they personally witnessed the

tic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1670 (2004). Women who have been battered
seem to be of two minds about these laws. While many seem to support the concept of
mandatory arrest laws (and no-drop prosecution policies) in theory, fewer believe that
those laws would actually improve their own situations. Many believe that such laws
would deter women (including themselves) from reporting violence. Alisa Smith, It’s My
Decision, Isn’t It? A Research Note on Battered Women’s Perceptions of Mandatory Intervention Laws, 6 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1384, 1384 (2000); see also Ferraro & Pope, supra,
at 119 (citing a study showing that women were evenly split on whether police interventions were helpful).
23. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973, 989 (1991).
24. Some have argued that violence against women was not only tolerated, but promoted by law and public policy. See Isabel Marcus, Reframing “Domestic Violence”: Terrorism in the Home, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE: THE DISCOVERY OF
DOMESTIC ABUSE 11, 21-22 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994).
25. Bruno v. Codd, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974, 976 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977).
26. Schneider, supra note 23, at 984-85.
27. Barbara Fedders, Lobbying for Mandatory-Arrest Policies: Race, Class, and the
Politics of the Battered Women’s Movement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 281, 281
(1997).
28. Halsted, supra note 1, at 156; see also Zorza, supra note 17, at 60.
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assaults.29 The first statutory changes won by the battered women’s
movement eased these restrictions, allowing officers to arrest whenever they had probable cause to believe that an act of domestic violence had occurred.30 But even after legislative revisions freed police
to make warrantless arrests in misdemeanor cases, arrest rates remained low, and arrests for domestic violence continued to be rare.31
In 1984, however, attitudes among law enforcement began to change
after the United States Department of Justice released the Attorney
General’s Task Force on Family Violence report, which recommended
a strong criminal justice response to domestic violence and touted
preferred arrest policies32—the beginning of the Department of Justice’s commitment to building a nationwide criminal justice infrastructure to hold perpetrators of domestic violence accountable for
their actions.
Early efforts to enact mandatory arrest laws were also bolstered
by research suggesting that arrest was linked to lowered rates of recidivism among perpetrators of domestic violence. In 1981 and 1982,
research in Minneapolis suggested that the arrest of domestic violence suspects deterred them from future violent behavior against
their partners.33 Lawrence Sherman, one of the authors of that study,
later wrote, “Although the authors cautioned against passage of
mandatory arrest laws for domestic violence until further research
could be conducted, by 1991 the results contributed to the passage of
such laws in 15 states.”34
Subsequent research in six additional cities would validate Sherman’s words of caution. While arrest proved to deter future violence
in some locations, in others there was no deterrent effect. Even
worse, some evidence indicated that arrest contributed to increases

29. Halsted, supra note 1, at 156 (explaining that prior to the 1970s, all but fourteen
states required the officer to witness a misdemeanor before making a warrantless arrest);
Fedders, supra note 27, at 288.
30. Fedders, supra note 27, at 288.
31. Halsted, supra note 1, at 156. In fact, the American Bar Association recommended
that police not bring domestic violence cases to court in order to assist “harried and overworked judges.” Jaffe et al., The Impact of Police Laying Charges, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO
WIFE ASSAULT: CURRENT TRENDS AND EVALUATION 62, 69 (N. Zoe Hilton ed., 1993).
32. Attorney General’s Task Force on Family Violence, September 3, 1984, at 24-25.
33. Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest
for Domestic Assault, 49 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 261, 270 (1984).
34. Lawrence W. Sherman et al., Crime, Punishment, and Stake in Conformity: Legal
and Informal Control of Domestic Violence, 57 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 680, 680 (1992) (internal citations omitted). Marvin Zalman suggests, however, that the authors were not
quite as circumspect as this quote would suggest. In fact, he contends, one of the authors
sent the results of the study to the media and the Police Foundation, whose dissemination
of their findings generated significant enthusiasm for mandatory arrest policies. Zalman,
supra note 18, at 84.
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in future violence.35 Sherman and his colleagues hypothesized that
arrest was a more effective deterrent for some offenders than others,
particularly those who had a greater “stake in conformity,” or believed that they had a great deal to lose by acting in a manner considered deviant or out of the norm.36 Sherman’s studies found that
those who were married and employed had a greater stake in conformity and therefore were more likely to be deterred by arrest.37
Race also factored into the deterrent effect of arrest. In cities with
large African American populations, arrest was positively correlated
with future violence, suggesting that arrest policies endangered African American women.38 Nonetheless, Sherman’s early work was cited
as justification for continuing to implement mandatory arrest policies
regardless of the demographics of the jurisdiction.39
Mandatory arrest laws got a further boost from the Violence
Against Women Act of 1994. This Act required states to certify that
they had adopted either pro- or mandatory arrest policies in order to
be eligible for federal funding under the Grants To Encourage Arrests program40—a program that provided $120 million over three
years to state and local police departments.41 Eager to ensure that
35. Sherman et al., supra note 34, at 680 (citing studies in Omaha, Charlotte, Milwaukee, Colorado Springs, and Dade County, Florida); see also Arnold Binder & James
Meeker, Arrest as a Method to Control Spouse Abuse, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE
CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 129, 130 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds.,
1992) ( “[W]e simply do not know whether arrest in response to cases of minor (misdemeanor) wife abuse is more or less effective in reducing recidivism than other available, and
less harsh, methods. But we do know that grave doubts about its efficacy have been raised
. . . . We certainly do not know the array of consequences, some possibly quite negative, of
spousal arrest on, first, relationships and general contentment in the home and, second,
the efficient operation of the criminal justice system. Yet, the approach of arrest in calls
involving minor spousal abuse has been adopted as expected operating procedure in police
departments throughout the country.”).
36. Sherman et al., supra note 34, at 687-88.
37. Id. at 686.
38. LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN ET AL., POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: EXPERIMENTS AND
DILEMMAS 3 (1992).
39. Miriam H. Ruttenberg, A Feminist Critique of Mandatory Arrest: An Analysis of
Race and Gender in Domestic Violence Policy, 2 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 171, 193-94 (1994).
This rush to embrace mandatory arrest was problematic, argues Marvin Zalman.
[W]hether the policy is wise or not, the pell-mell manner in which it was
adopted indicates that conclusions were being made by lawyers, police chiefs,
legislators, and policy advocates about a scientific finding (deterrence) based
more upon a desired outcome than on a careful analysis of the Minneapolis
Domestic Violence Experiment. This raises serious questions about the relationship between social knowledge, research findings, and legal action.
Zalman, supra note 18, at 106.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 3796hh(c)(1) (West 2008); see also Jenny Rivera, The Violence Against
Women Act and the Construction of Multiple Consciousness in the Civil Rights and Feminist Movements, 4 J.L. & POL’Y 463, 503-04 (1996).
41. Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence Law:
A Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 801, 803 n. 5 (2001).
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they would be able to access this important funding, states that had
not already adopted such laws quickly did so. Today, every state has
some form of pro-arrest policy and, as of 2004, at least twenty states
and the District of Columbia mandated arrest in cases involving domestic violence.42
Once advocates had convinced states to enact mandatory arrest
laws, they turned to the next obstacle in ensuring batterer accountability using the criminal system: prosecutors. Just as police officers
historically had used their discretion to refuse to arrest perpetrators
of domestic violence, prosecutors had also routinely chosen not to
pursue cases against the few perpetrators of violence who police had
actually arrested.43 Ironically, prosecutors’ failure to pursue cases involving domestic violence has been cited as yet another reason police
declined to make arrests.44
Scholars have posited a number of reasons for the low rate of
prosecution in domestic violence cases: the lack of evidence, the patriarchal views of prosecutors, skepticism about the seriousness of
the crimes involved, and prosecutors’ perceptions that judges were
not interested in entertaining such cases.45 The justification most
frequently offered by prosecutors for their reluctance to pursue domestic violence cases was their inability to rely on their star witnesses—the wives and girlfriends of the men they were prosecuting.46
The unwillingness of victims to testify to the abuse they had suffered
deprived prosecutors of their best, and often their only, witnesses and
hamstrung prosecutions in which the testimony of the involved parties was the only available evidence.
The failure of women who had been battered to participate in
prosecutions was widely attributed to the victims’ fear of repercussions at the hands of their abusers,47 a credible fear given that, even
after successful prosecution, sentences for domestic violence offenses

42. Leigh Goodmark, Law Is the Answer? Do We Know that for Sure?: Questioning the
Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 7, 15
(2004).
43. JEFFREY FAGAN, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: PROMISES AND
LIMITS 15 (1996); LISA A. GOODMAN & DEBORAH EPSTEIN, LISTENING TO BATTERED
WOMEN: A SURVIVOR-CENTERED APPROACH TO ADVOCACY, MENTAL HEALTH, & JUSTICE 73
(2008).
44. Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice: Tempering the State’s Response to Domestic
Violence, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1843, 1887 (2002); Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose:
Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849,
1893 (1996). Police officers also expressed unhappiness with the court response to domestic
violence charges. Jaffe et al., supra note 31, at 64.
45. FAGAN, supra note 43, at 42; Hanna, supra note 44, at 1860-61.
46. Hanna, supra note 44, at 1860.
47. Naomi R. Cahn, Innovative Approaches to the Prosecution of Domestic Violence
Crimes: An Overview, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE
RESPONSE, 161, 163 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1992).
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were ridiculously light and jail time was rarely imposed in misdemeanor cases.48 Prosecutors began to look for ways to ensure that
cases could be brought successfully even if victims chose not to participate in the process—a method that has come to be known as victimless prosecution.
The success of victimless prosecution hinges on the willingness of
police officers to respond to cases involving domestic violence differently and more thoroughly than they would ordinary assault cases.
Police officers were trained to carefully investigate crime scenes,
make detailed reports, and collect evidence that would allow prosecutors to pursue cases even when the victims were unwilling to testify—much as police would investigate homicide cases.49 Prosecutors
relied on physical evidence, photographs of both the victim and the
perpetrator (to show his demeanor at the time of arrest and any injuries, defensive or otherwise), recordings of 9-1-1 tapes, statements
made to police, medical records, and other witness statements to secure convictions in cases that would have been impossible to successfully prosecute without such careful attention to gathering evidence.50
Victimless prosecution allowed prosecutors to circumvent the
wishes of the victim by replacing her testimony, which had previously been viewed as essential, with other evidence sufficient to persuade a finder of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that the charged
crime had actually been committed. Victimless prosecution also
enabled prosecutors to undermine the testimony of victims who appeared on behalf of their partners, impeaching them with prior inconsistent statements to police, or confronting them with photographs of injuries and their own words on 9-1-1 tapes.51
Despite the implementation of these increasingly sophisticated
methods of preparing domestic violence cases, prosecutorial reluctance to bring domestic violence cases and victim unwillingness to
testify continued to hamper successful prosecutions. The adoption of
no-drop prosecution was meant to address both of these issues. Nodrop means exactly what it says—prosecutors would not dismiss
48. Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Hope: The Crime and Punishment of Domestic Violence, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1505, 1508, 1521-22 (1998).
49. Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 550, 561 (1999).
50. BARBARA E. SMITH ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT NO-DROP
POLICIES: TWO CENTRAL VALUES IN CONFLICT iii (2001). Cheryl Hanna suggests that improved evidence gathering could help prosecutors avoid having to compel women who have
been battered to testify through subpoenas, warrants, and incarceration. Hanna, supra
note 44, at 1901.
51. See, e.g., State v. Hancock, No. C-030459, 2004 WL 596103 (Ohio App. 1 Dist.
Mar. 26, 2004) (upholding conviction in domestic violence case where a witness was impeached with written and videotaped statements to police); State v. Spraggins, No. 82170,
2003 WL 22971050 (Ohio App. 8 Dist. Dec. 18, 2003) (affirming conviction in domestic violence case where a witness was impeached with sworn statement).
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criminal charges in otherwise winnable cases simply because the victim was not interested in, or was even adamantly opposed to, pursuing the case.52
Advocates of no-drop prosecution strategies offer three justifications for the policies. First, they argue that no-drop prosecution in
domestic violence cases is good for society in that the purpose of the
criminal system is not to bend to the wishes of individual victims, but
rather to punish offenders and to deter others from committing similar crimes.53 The role of the prosecutor in the American criminal system is to reinforce the state’s conception of the boundaries of acceptable behavior by ensuring compliance with the laws that define and
regulate what individuals are and are not permitted to do.54 The failure to prosecute domestic violence cases, whether attributable to prosecutorial diffidence or victim unwillingness, sends the message that
violence against one’s intimate partner is acceptable, in direct contravention of the criminal laws.55 Consistent enforcement of the law
is essential in ensuring respect for that law.56 Allowing intimate
partners to continue to flout those laws without fear of repercussion
enabled perpetrators of domestic violence to believe that the laws
against abusing one’s intimate partner could be taken as seriously as
most individuals take speed laws on major highways—which is to
say, not seriously at all.
The second justification proffered for no-drop prosecution is victim
safety. Prosecuting those who commit domestic violence increases
safety both for the individual victim by removing the immediate
threat to her, and for future victims of the same perpetrator.57 The
victim’s inability to thwart the process is a particularly important
guarantor of her safety. Because the victim no longer has the ability
to stop the prosecutor from bringing the case to court, her abuser has
no motivation to pressure her to do so.58 Shifting the burden of deciding whether to prosecute the abuser from the victim to the prosecutor
was thought to significantly safeguard the victim from further coercion and violence.
The final justification for no-drop prosecution policies was, ironically, victim empowerment. Women who had been battered, the ar52. Sack, supra note 22, at 1673.
53. Hanna, supra note 44, at 1870.
54. Id.
55. Sack, supra note 22, at 1673.
56. See LEON RADZINOWICZ, IDEOLOGY AND CRIME 113 (1966).
57. Hanna, supra note 44, at 1870; Sack, supra note 22, at 1673. But see David A.
Ford & Mary Jean Regoli, The Criminal Prosecution of Wife Assaulters: Process, Problems,
and Effects, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO WIFE ASSAULT: CURRENT TRENDS AND EVALUATION
127, 157, 159 (N. Zoe Hilton ed., 1993) (citing studies that suggest that allowing victims to
drop charges they initiate after the abuser is arrested reduces the risk of future violence).
58. Sack, supra note 22, at 1673.
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gument went, would derive strength and validation from the experience of participating in the prosecution.59 This argument assumed
successful prosecution of the case and positive treatment of the victim throughout the process.
One important distinction in the realm of prosecution policy is between “hard” and “soft” no-drop policies. In “soft” no-drop jurisdictions, victim testimony is not compelled; instead, prosecutors work
with women who have been battered to help them feel comfortable
with the system and offer them resources and support that will make
compliance with the prosecutor’s requests to assist in the prosecution
possible.60 If the woman who has been battered is ultimately unwilling, unable, or uninterested in assisting prosecutors, she will not be
forced to do so (although the services and support the woman may be
relying on may no longer be available if she chooses not to cooperate
with prosecutors).61
“Hard” no-drop policies, in contrast, are the purest form of these
policies—prosecutors pursue their cases regardless of the victim’s
wishes so long as sufficient evidence to prosecute exists.62 In a hard
no-drop jurisdiction, when a victim is unwilling to appear voluntarily,
prosecutors might subpoena her to testify or, in the most extreme
cases, issue a warrant for her arrest and/or have her incarcerated in
order to compel her testimony.63 Law professor Cheryl Hanna, a former prosecutor, explains the necessity for such actions: “No-drop policies that do not compel victim cooperation lack credibility.”64 If both
the perpetrator and victim are aware that the prosecutor will not follow through on the threat to force the victim’s compliance, there is
little incentive for the perpetrator to refrain from pressuring the victim to withdraw her support for prosecution65 and even less for the
reluctant victim to comply voluntarily.
At their core, these policies reflect a struggle over who will control
the woman who has been battered—if the state does not exercise its
control over her by compelling her testimony, the batterer will, by
preventing her from testifying. Hard no-drop policies express the
state’s belief that it has a superior right to intervene on behalf of the
woman who has been battered in service of both the woman’s needs
and the state’s objectives. Using Barbara Hart’s hierarchy of the
59. Erin L. Han, Mandatory Arrest and No-Drop Policies: Victim Empowerment in
Domestic Violence Cases, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 159, 184 (2003).
60. Hanna, supra note 44, at 1863.
61. For a discussion of the role of one of these supports, police victim advocates, see
MARY ANN DUTTON, EMPOWERING AND HEALING THE BATTERED WOMAN: A MODEL FOR
ASSESSMENT AND INTERVENTION 10 (1992).
62. Hanna, supra note 44, at 1863.
63. Id. at 1867.
64. Id. at 1891.
65. Id. at 1891-92.
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goals of legal interventions in domestic violence cases, hard no-drop
policies clearly prioritize safety over all other aims, including fostering the agency of the woman who has been battered.
B. (Not) Mediating Family Law Matters
As alternative dispute resolution grows more popular in the legal
system, ever-increasing numbers of civil family law matters have
been deemed appropriate for mediation. In some jurisdictions, a litigant cannot have a claim for divorce or custody heard without first
engaging in mediation.66 Often described as cheaper, easier, and less
formal than litigation, mediation is thought to give litigants greater
control over the terms of the agreements they reach, encourage cooperation between the parties, and increase litigants’ satisfaction with
the legal process.67 From the outset of the mediation explosion, however, commentators and advocates for women who have been battered have been almost universally opposed to employing mediation
to resolve cases involving domestic violence.68 Professor Tara Lea
Muhlhauser’s position is representative: “Mediation is unequivocally
66. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3170 (West 2008) (requiring the court to send all cases
involving custody or visitation to mediation); see Jane C. Murphy & Robert Rubinson, Domestic Violence and Mediation: Responding to the Challenges of Crafting Effective Screens,
39 FAM. L. Q. 53, 71-84 (2005) (cataloging state laws on mediation in family law cases).
67. See generally René L. Rimelspach, Mediating Family Disputes in a World With
Domestic Violence: How To Devise a Safe and Effective Court-Connected Mediation Program, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 95 (2001); Andrew Schepard, The Evolving Judicial
Role in Child Custody Disputes: From Fault Finder to Conflict Manager to Differential
Case Management, 22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 395 (2000); Nancy Ver Steegh, Yes, No,
and Maybe: Informed Decision Making About Divorce Mediation in the Presence of Domestic Violence, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 145 (2003); Alexandria Zylstra, Mediation and
Domestic Violence: A Practical Screening Method for Mediators and Mediation Program
Administrators, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 253 (2001).
68. See, e.g., Sara Cobb, The Domestication of Violence in Mediation, 31 L. & SOC’Y
REV. 397, 397-98 (1997); Margaret Drew, Lawyer Malpractice and Domestic Violence: Are
We Revictimizing Our Clients?, 39 FAM. L. Q. 7, 19 (2005); Alana Dunnigan, Restoring Power to the Powerless: The Need to Reform California’s Mandatory Mediation for Victims of
Domestic Violence, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 1031, 1031 (2003); Karla Fischer et al., The Culture of
Battering and the Role of Mediation in Domestic Violence Cases, 46 S.M.U. L. REV. 2117,
2117-18 (1993); Andree G. Gagnon, Ending Mandatory Divorce Mediation for Battered
Women, 15 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 272, 272 (1992); Andre R. Imbrogno, Using ADR to Address
Issues of Public Concern: Can ADR Become an Instrument for Social Oppression?, 14 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 855, 855 (1999); Nancy E. Johnson et al., Child Custody Mediation
in Cases of Domestic Violence: Empirical Evidence of a Failure to Protect, 11 VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 1022, 1022 (2005); Sarah Krieger, The Dangers of Mediation in Domestic
Violence Cases, 8 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 235, 235 (2002); Kelly Rowe, The Limits of the
Neighborhood Justice Center: Why Domestic Violence Cases Should Not Be Mediated, 34
EMORY L.J. 855, 855 (1985); Laurel Wheeler, Mandatory Family Mediation and Domestic
Violence, 26 S. ILL. U. L. J. 559, 559 (2002). The National Coalition Against Domestic Violence has stated that mediation is never appropriate when psychological or physical battering has occurred in a relationship. Megan G. Thompson, Mandatory Mediation and Domestic Violence: Reformulating the Good-Faith Standard, 86 OR. L. REV. 599, 620 (2007)
(citing to NCADV position paper).

2009]

AUTONOMY FEMINISM

15

wrong when the dynamics of violence exist in a relationship.”69 Or, as
advocates Allen M. Bailey and Carmen Kay Denny ask, “[H]ow is a
client, whose spouse shoved the barrel of a .44 magnum revolver into
her or his ear and threatened to kill, supposed to benefit from a
‘heart to heart’ talk with the battering partner and negotiate custody
of their children or anything else?”70 Theoretical and practical concerns about the appropriateness of mediating such cases seem to
drive this opposition.
Some opponents of mediation fear that mediating cases involving
domestic violence trivializes these matters. Because safety is the
overriding concern for many advocates, the inability of mediation to
stop the violence and ensure safety is a sufficient reason to avoid the
process.71 Women should not have to negotiate for their safety;72
agreements that make the cessation of abuse contingent on some
concession by the woman who has been battered are completely unacceptable for that reason.73 But even when the violence itself is not
what is being mediated, critics contend that using alternative dispute
resolution to address cases involving domestic violence undermines
the seriousness with which such cases are treated.74
Relegating these issues to mediators rather than using the time
and resources of the court system to resolve them sends the message
that these cases are not as important as others. Opponents of mediation have charged gender bias in the consignment of “women’s issues”
like domestic violence to alternative dispute resolution.75 Critics further contend that the development of the law in cases involving domestic violence is stunted when cases are resolved through mediated
agreements rather than adversarial proceedings, which can create
binding precedent favorable to the women who follow.76
Privacy is again a concern in the debate over mediating domestic
violence cases. Given the efforts of advocates to move domestic violence from the private sphere to the public arena of the legal system,
69. Douglas D. Knowlton & Tara Lea Muhlhauser, Mediation in the Presence of Domestic Violence: Is it the Light at the End of the Tunnel or is a Train on the Track?, 70 N.D.
L. REV. 255, 267 (1994).
70. Allen M. Bailey & Carmen Kay Denny, Attorneys Comment on Mediation and
Domestic Violence, 27 ALASKA BAR RAG 16 (July/August 2003) (internal citation omitted).
71. See, e.g., Barbara J. Hart, Gentle Jeopardy: The Further Endangerment of Battered Women and Children in Custody Mediation, 7 MEDIATION Q. 317 (1990); Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on
Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 57 (1984).
72. Fischer et al., supra note 68, at 2153.
73. Id. at 2159 (“Any agreement that is structured in the format of ‘Mr. Abuser agrees
to stop the abuse and Ms. Victim agrees to ___’ is conceptually wrong.”).
74. See, e.g., Gagnon, supra note 68, at 275-76; Lerman, supra note 71, at 72.
75. See Cobb, supra note 68, at 398 (summarizing these arguments).
76. Leigh Goodmark, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Potential for Gender Bias, 35 JUDGES J. 21, 24 (2000).
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it is hardly surprising that the effort to shift resolution of cases involving domestic violence into a private dispute resolution system is
unpopular. Allowing mediation of these cases “causes the reprivatization of family law resulting in a setback to the political and
legislative progress of the battered women’s movement.”77 Mediating
cases involving domestic violence removes such violence from the
public eye and makes it easier for the legal system and the public
alike to underestimate the prevalence of violence in family relationships and the toll that such violence takes on women who have been
battered and their children.78
Moreover, mediating cases involving domestic violence allows perpetrators to avoid public sanction for their actions, undermining the
goal of batterer accountability.79 This is particularly true, opponents
have argued, because mediation is focused on the future.80 Many mediators discourage discussions of past abuse and fail to consider how
that abuse could affect negotiated arrangements for interactions between the parties going forward.81 This future focus prevents women
who have been battered from using mediation to confront their partners with their actions and the consequences of their use of violence.
This focus also precludes women who have been battered from discussing how their fears of further violence and control color their
reactions to proposed custody and visitation plans or their concerns
that abusers will use economic tools, like withholding alimony and
child support, to continue to exercise control post-separation.
Another theoretical concern about mediating such cases is the inability to reconcile the ideology and practices of mediation with the
realities of domestic violence. Mediation is frequently described as a
method of resolving conflicts; by contrast, advocates for women who
have been battered are quick to explain that domestic violence is not
about conflict, but rather control and the use of violence to maintain
that control.82 Mediation provides the abuser with yet another opportunity to attempt to exert control over his partner—an opportunity
that may be particularly welcome to the abuser after the parties have
separated and his access to his victim decreased.83
Even if it appears that particular areas of conflict between the
parties, like child custody and marital property, are being resolved,
the larger issue of control lurks in the shadows and may constrain
77. Krieger, supra note 68, at 235.
78. Cobb, supra note 68, at 437 (“[M]ediation condones and harbors violence, thereby
extending the awful secret of violence beyond the boundaries of the family into the community and the legal system itself.”).
79. See Fischer et al., supra note 68, at 2162-63.
80. Id. at 2160-61.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2118.
83. Drew, supra note 68, at 19.
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the ability of the woman who has been battered to confidently assert
her positions.84 As a result, the woman may not negotiate forcefully
and may concede too much in order to avoid angering her partner.85
Her partner, in contrast, may contest points that are truly unimportant to him simply because he can and because he knows that it
will unnerve his former partner. Mediation is said to require
cooperation between the parties; cooperation with someone who
changes his demands only to demoralize the other participant is a
practical impossibility. 86
The scant possibility of reaching an agreement makes mediation a
costly addition to the legal process.87 Because settlement is unlikely,
mediation (which may require payments to a mediator and counsel)
becomes yet another hurdle that the woman who has been battered
must clear before getting access to the courtroom, where her concerns
will finally be heard and her claims adjudicated.88
Perhaps the most frequently cited justification for avoiding mediation in cases involving domestic violence is the power imbalance between the parties.89 One of the core principles of mediation is that the
parties come to the table with equal power, equally able to assert
their positions and to discuss and negotiate the terms of an agreement between them.90 Some critics contend that all women are at a
disadvantage in mediation by virtue of their unequal economic and
social power.91 Most agree that women who have been battered are at
a distinct disadvantage in mediation as a result of the coercion and
violence that have characterized their relationships.92 The assumption is that a woman who has been battered is simply incapable of
equaling her batterer’s power. As Professors Karla Fischer, Neil
Vidmar, and Rene Ellis write, “[B]y its very nature the culture of a
84. Imbrogno, supra note 68, at 864.
85. In their study of mediation in cases involving domestic violence, Lisa Newmark,
Adele Harrell, and Peter Salem found that “[a]bused women may believe that they can
state their needs and seem willing to stand up for themselves but feel there could be negative repercussions for doing so.” Lisa Newmark et al., Domestic Violence and Empowerment
in Custody and Visitation Cases, 33 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 30, 57 (1995).
86. Gagnon, supra note 68, at 275; Imbrogno, supra note 68, at 863-64.
87. Drew, supra note 68, at 19.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Fischer et al., supra note 68, at 2168-69; Krieger, supra note 68, at 24546; Rowe, supra note 68, at 861-62.
90. Imbrogno, supra note 68, at 860.
91. Id. at 860-61.
92. See, e.g., Drew, supra note 68, at 20 (citing with approval the report of the American Bar Association Commission on Domestic Violence); Fischer et al., supra note 68, at
2168; Imbrogno, supra note 68, at 862; Johnson et al., supra note 68, at 1027. Some mediation proponents agree with this position. See Desmond Ellis, Family Courts, Marital Conflict Mediation, and Wife Assault, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO WIFE ASSAULT: CURRENT
TRENDS AND EVALUATION 165, 183 (N. Zoe Hilton ed., 1993) (explaining the position that
only those cases involving “serious and unalterable imbalance of power” should be excluded
from mediation).
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battering makes the couple unequal in subtle and pervasive ways.”93
As a result, productive mediation is said never to be possible in cases
involving domestic violence.
This theoretical concern about the innate power imbalance between a woman who has been battered and her abuser is tied to a
pragmatic concern about the mediator’s inability to redress those
power imbalances. The mediation literature is replete with references
to the mediator’s ability to “balance the power” between the parties,
but descriptions of just how a mediator is able to balance power or
how a party can be sure that the power is, in fact, balanced before
mediation proceeds are rare.94 Power differentials in cases involving
domestic violence are significantly different than in other kinds of relationships; the mediator may be attempting to balance power between parties who have been in unequal positions for years or who
have never been equals within the relationship.95 Professors Fischer,
Vidmar, and Ellis note, “the notion that power which has been grossly imbalanced over the course of an entire multi-year relationship
can be shifted within a two hour mediation session minimizes the seriousness of the impact of the abuse on battered women.”96 A mediator’s assurances that he can balance the power sufficiently to ensure
that her interests are protected in mediation may prove cold comfort
to the woman who has been battered. Battered woman’s advocate
Joan Zorza has argued that women who have been battered are so
fearful and submissive that even mediators with a sophisticated understanding of domestic violence cannot bridge the power differential.97
Few mediators, opponents argue, have the kind of specialized
training in and experience with domestic violence that would enable
them to identify the violence in the first instance.98 Mediators are not
always required by law to have training in domestic violence, although model standards developed for mediators in family law cases
require such training.99 One survey of over 200 courts and mediation
services throughout the United States indicated that 30% of the pro-

93. Fischer et al., supra note 68, at 2162.
94. But see Ver Steegh, supra note 67, at 186-87.
95. Fischer et al., supra note 68, at 2168-69; Jennifer P. Maxwell, Mandatory Mediation of Custody in the Face of Domestic Violence: Suggestions for Courts and Mediators, 37
FAM. & CONCILATION CTS. REV. 335, 344 (1999).
96. Fischer et al., supra note 68, at 2168.
97. Joan Zorza, Protecting the Children in Custody: Disputes When One Parent Abuses
the Other, 29 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1113, § V(B) (1996).
98. See, e.g., Fischer et al., supra note 68, at 2169-2171.
99. THE SYMPOSIUM ON STANDARDS OF PRACTICE: MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE
FOR FAMILY AND DIVORCE MEDIATION (2000), available at http://www.afccnet.org/pdfs/
modelstandards.pdf (“A family mediator shall recognize a family situation involving domestic abuse and take appropriate steps to shape the mediation process accordingly.”).
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grams do not train their staff to identify domestic violence.100 Without
such training, some fear that mediators will not recognize the kind of
subtle manipulation that the abuser might use to prevent his victim
from fully participating in the mediation.101 The abuser might even
be able to turn the mediator against the woman who has been battered, contributing to a climate in which the woman feels that she
cannot assert herself or have her concerns heard, or causing the mediator to pressure her to accept an unfair agreement.102
Although many states require that mediators screen for domestic
violence before beginning work with the parties, that screening may
not be occurring and, if it is, may not be effective in identifying violence in the relationship. Two recent studies examining mediation of
family law matters in Maryland, a state that prohibits mediation in
cases involving domestic violence, found that mediations occurred in
a significant number of custody cases although domestic violence was
clearly present.103
Even when mediators screen for and identify domestic violence,
they may not change their regular practices to account for the violence. In their review of policies and practices for mediating custody
cases involving domestic violence, researchers Nancy Thoennes, Peter Salem, and Jessica Pearson found that 74% of mediators sometimes conducted mediations in cases involving domestic violence
without changing their regular practice; 3% of mediators with domestic violence training and 17% of mediators without training reported
that they never changed their techniques in cases involving domestic
violence.104 These mediators, then, are unlikely to be taking special
measures either to ensure the safety of the woman who has been battered or to balance the power between the parties.
Another problematic aspect of mediating domestic violence cases
is that the woman who has been battered must articulate her own
goals and needs during the mediation—a task that she may simply
be unable to accomplish when confronted with her abusive partner.
In her study of 129 divorced women with children, social scientist
Demie Kurz found that 30% of women were fearful during their child
support negotiations, 38% were fearful during custody negotiations,

100. Nancy Thoennes et al., Mediation and Domestic Violence: Current Policies and
Practices, 33 FAM. & CONCILATION CTS. REV. 6, 25 (1995).
101. Fischer et al., supra note 68, at 2172.
102. See Desmond Ellis, Safety, Equity, and Human Agency: Contributions of Divorce
Mediation, 6 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1012, 1017 (2000).
103. Murphy & Rubinson, supra note 66, at 63. Murphy and Rubinson also note that
screening can never be perfect because some women do not identify their relationships as
abusive, either because they do not see them that way or because they do not want to disclose the abuse. Id. at 64.
104. Thoennes et al., supra note 100, at 20-21.
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and 35% were fearful during marital property negotiations.105 These
fears, Kurz discovered, were linked to the women’s experiences of violence during their marriages and separations and were stronger for
women who had experienced more frequent or serious violence.106
As a result of these fears of violence, both past and future, Kurz
found, these women reduced the amount of their requests for child
support and, in some cases, abandoned their cases altogether.107 Kurz
concludes, “[T]hese data suggest that a substantial group of women
negotiate for resources in a ‘climate of fear’ in which their fear of violence can lead them to forfeit their rights.”108 Imagine how much
more difficult it would be for a woman to forcefully assert her rights
while sitting in close proximity to her abuser in a process that expects her to be able to come to some agreement. And while having
counsel present during the mediation might alleviate some of these
concerns, in many mediations counsel are not permitted to attend, let
alone participate.109 Even if counsel is present, these same concerns
might prevent a woman from giving counsel either the information or
the authority to negotiate freely on her behalf.
Safety concerns are another reason for discouraging mediation in
cases involving domestic violence. Mediation may require that the
parties share the same physical space, giving the abuser access to the
woman that he may have been denied by separation or by court order.110 Court-ordered mediation could, in fact, enable the abusive
partner to circumvent the terms of a court order requiring him to
stay away from his partner.111 Once granted that access, opponents
argue, the potential for violence during the mediation itself exists,
with few of the kinds of safeguards in place, like court security personnel and metal detectors, which protect women who have been battered when they enter courtrooms to confront their abusers.112 Mediation could trigger violence not just during the session itself, but afterwards; having expressed her desires and, by so doing, undermined
her partner’s control, the woman who has been battered might fear
that her abuser will retaliate against her as a way of reestablishing
his dominance.113

105. Demie Kurz, Separation, Divorce, and Woman Abuse, 2 VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN 63, 71 (1996).
106. Id. at 71-72.
107. Id. at 72.
108. Id. at 76.
109. Craig A. McEwen et al., Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1317, 1319 (1995).
110. Drew, supra note 68, at 19.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Murphy & Rubinson, supra note 66, at 56.
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Recall the benefits of mediation listed earlier: cheaper, easier, less
formal, gives litigants greater control, encourages cooperation, increases satisfaction. Few of these justifications for promoting mediation seem to operate in cases involving domestic violence, but potential dangers abound in mediating these cases. For that reason, many
advocates have fought to ensure that women who have been battered
can avoid mediation, and they have been remarkably successful.
Some states require that mediators screen for domestic violence before beginning mediation.114 Many states allow women who have been
battered to opt out of mediation if they can persuade the court or the
mediator that there is a history of violence in the relationship or if
there is currently a protective order in effect.115 Delaware’s law is typical:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, Family Court mediation conferences shall be prohibited in any child
custody or visitation proceeding in which 1 of the parties has been
found by a court, whether in that proceeding or in some other proceeding, to have committed an act of domestic violence against the
other party or if either party has been ordered to stay away or
have no contact with the other party, unless a victim of domestic
violence who is represented by counsel requests such mediation.116

Because they cannot feel confident that mediation will be a safe and
productive process for women who have been battered, advocates
routinely warn women away from participating in mediation, encouraging them to use these provisions to opt out of the process
whenever possible. One critic of mediation has even suggested that
states require women who have been battered to participate in therapy before and while engaging in mediation with their partners.117
In a few states, women who have been battered have no choice regarding mediation. Cases involving domestic violence cannot be mediated, regardless of the wishes of the parties involved. Maryland
law, for example, prohibits the court from ordering mediation in cases in which a party or child (or a mediation program that has
screened the case) represents to the court that there is a genuine issue of physical or sexual abuse of a party or child that
makes mediation inappropriate for the situation.118 Illinois,119 Minnesota,120 Montana,121 North Dakota,122 and Pennsylvania123 also pro114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 63.
Id. at 71-85.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 711A (2008).
Dunnigan, supra note 68, at 1059-60.
MD. CODE ANN. § 9-205(b)-(c) (West 2008).
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602.1, 5/607.1 (2008).
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 484.73 (West 2008).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-301 (West 2007).
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hibit courts from sending cases involving domestic violence to mediation. Such laws and policies ensure that women who have been battered cannot be further harmed by the process and must instead pursue their claims through the adversarial system—the ultimate protection that advocates can provide.
III. DEFINING AUTONOMY AND AGENCY
These policies all seem like perfectly reasonable responses to deficiencies in the legal system’s ability to respond adequately to domestic violence. Before we can determine whether exchanging a woman’s
ability to control her participation in the legal system for the mandated protection of that system has been a good bargain for women
who have been battered, however, we should first consider the values
of autonomy and agency.
What does autonomy mean? While that might seem a facile question, for philosophers it is a much more complicated one than it might
appear. Autonomy has alternately been described as a basic state of
being and as a competence that one must develop.124 Contrast basic
autonomy, which references individuals who are responsible, independent, and able to speak for themselves, with ideal autonomy,
which requires that individuals operate in a state of maximal authenticity of choice, free of any self-distorting influences.125 Philosophers have defined autonomy as the theoretical capacity for selfgovernance, the actual condition of self-governance, the ideal of selfgovernance in a state of absolute freedom, and a set of rights that
undergird the ability to establish sovereignty over the self.126 Fundamentally, however, autonomy is constituted of the independence to
deliberate and make choices free from manipulation by others and
the capacity to make reasoned decisions about how to live one’s life.127

122.
123.
124.
125.

N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09.1-02 (2008).
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3901 (West 2008).
See generally DIANA T. MEYERS, SELF, SOCIETY AND PERSONAL CHOICE (1989).
John Christman, Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy, STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/autonomy-moral/
(last visited Oct. 27, 2009).
126. Id. (citing JOEL FEINBERG, AUTONOMY IN THE INNER CITADEL: ESSAYS ON
INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY 27 (John Christman ed., 1989)).
127. See, e.g., GRACE CLEMENT, CARE, AUTONOMY, AND JUSTICE: FEMINISM AND THE
ETHIC OF CARE 22 (1996) (“Most literally, autonomy means self-determination. An autonomous person is one who is in control of his or her life rather than being controlled by
outside forces.”); MORWENNA GRIFFITHS, FEMINISMS AND THE SELF: THE WEB OF IDENTITY
135 (1995) (“I am taking ‘autonomy’ to mean much the same as ‘independence.’ Both terms
routinely apply to the self-rule of individuals, of groups, and of states.”); Diana T. Meyers,
Gendered Work and Individual Autonomy, in RECOGNITION, RESPONSIBILITY AND RIGHTS:
FEMINIST ETHICS AND SOCIAL THEORY 19, 20 (Robin N. Fiore & Hilde Lindemann Nelson
eds., 2003) ( “[T]o be autonomous is (1) to figure out what your personal values and goals
are—what really matters to you as an individual and what you as an individual really
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As philosopher John Christman writes, “[T]he unifying idea behind
the various uses of the notion of autonomy is that of ‘selfgovernment’—being or doing only what one freely, independently,
and authentically chooses to be or do.”128
Autonomy is at the heart of liberal political philosophy. The idea
that individuals should be able to choose how to govern their lives
without the state dictating those choices (either to achieve its preferred goals or to protect people from choices it believes to be antithetical to their well-being) is central to the theories of Immanuel
Kant and John Stuart Mill, whose work forms the basis of much of
American political thought.129 Not surprisingly, then, autonomy is also one of the cornerstones of the American legal system.130
Feminists have long been conflicted about the role of autonomy in
shaping the law.131 Some feminists have rejected the individualistic
bent of autonomy.132 Although autonomy seems congruent with the
feminist goal of liberation, some have instead characterized autonomy as selfish and egotistical.133 They argue that valuing the individualism of autonomy rejects the reality of women’s lives, which are
often deeply intertwined with the lives of others.134 In response, femiwant out of life; (2) to figure out how you can fulfill those self-chosen values and goals; and
(3) to act in ways that are congruent with those self-chosen values and goals.”).
128. John Christman, Feminism and Autonomy, in “NAGGING” QUESTIONS: FEMINIST
ETHICS IN EVERYDAY LIFE 17, 18 (Dana E. Bushnell ed., 1995).
129. Christman, supra note 125. As Joseph W. Singer explains, “Under the theory of liberty championed by John Stuart Mill . . . it is a violation of autonomy for courts or legislatures to act paternalistically to protect individuals from their own mistakes on the ground
that these government officials know better than individuals what is in their best interest.”
Joseph W. Singer, Things that We Would Like to Take for Granted: Minimum Standards
for the Legal Framework of a Free and Democratic Society, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 139,
143 (2008).
130. David R. Katner, The Ethical Struggle of Usurping Juvenile Client Autonomy by
Raising Competency in Delinquency and Criminal Cases, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 293,
298 (2007).
131. For an overview of feminist critiques of autonomy, see Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar, Introduction: Autonomy Refigured, in RELATIONAL AUTONOMY: FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES ON AUTONOMY, AGENCY, AND THE SOCIAL SELF 3, 5-7 (Catriona Mackenzie &
Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000).
132. CLEMENT, supra note 127, at 22 (1996). Clement argues for a definition of autonomy that acknowledges the social construction of identity and allows for the achievement
of autonomy through relationships to others. Id. at 24. Such critiques are closely linked to
what has been called “different voice” or “ethic of care” feminism, which stresses the differences in the ways that men and women relate to the world and argues that the law should
value women’s desire for interconnectedness just as it does the ideal of the strong, independent male.
133. Christman, supra note 128, at 30.
134. But see ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY
AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 9 (1987) (“[F]or the
sake of their children, or the redemption of their husbands[,] wives have traditionally been
urged to renounce their personal liberty. Many women have been bound to marriage and
the family by this sense of duty and obligation. It follows, then, that the desire for personal
autonomy, especially among women, would threaten family stability.”).
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nist philosophers have developed relational theories of autonomy,
which stress the ability to achieve autonomy within a world in which
individuals are socially constructed and shaped by their relationships
with others.135
Feminist theorists have also argued that the emphasis on autonomy within liberal political philosophy and the law disadvantages
women who, by virtue of their subordinated status as victims of a patriarchal system, are rarely able to exercise the sort of autonomy contemplated by philosophers.136 Philosopher Susan Wendell articulates
this position:
Much of what women appear to do freely is chosen in very limiting
circumstances, where there are few choices left to us. Even where
the circumstances present many choices, it is often the case that
our knowledge, our ability to judge, and our desires have been so
distorted and manipulated by social influences as to make a mockery of the idea that we choose freely.137

Because women can only contemplate options and make choices within a patriarchal frame, which limits and distorts the options that are
available, their choices can never truly be free. To value autonomy
within a political system, then, is to ensure that women can never be
equal actors within that system. As philosopher Morwenna Griffiths
writes, “[A]utonomy is often thought to present a problem for women
because (1) it is a desirable quality; and (2) women don’t have it.”138
Some feminist thinkers have attempted to incorporate the ideas
underlying the concept of autonomy while rejecting the philosophical
baggage that the term autonomy carries for feminists. The word has
become so fraught, law professor Kathryn Abrams suggests, that it
should be rejected in favor of the term agency, which captures the
key features of autonomy—self-definition and self-direction—but recognizes how social construction delimits the choices available to
women.139 For Abrams, self-definition involves “determining how one
conceives of oneself in terms of the goals one wants to achieve and
the kind of person, with particular values and attributes, one consid135. See, e.g., CLEMENT, supra note 127, at 45-46; Misha Strauss, The Role of Recognition in the Formation of Self-Understanding, in RECOGNITION, RESPONSIBILITY, AND
RIGHTS: FEMINIST ETHICS AND SOCIAL THEORY 37, 46-47 (Robin N. Fiore & Hilde Lindemann Nelson eds., 2003).
136. GRIFFITHS, supra note 127, at 135-36; Patricia Smith, Autonomy, Aspiration and
Accomplishment: Some Steps and Barriers to Equality for Women, 9 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 257, 272 (1998).
137. Susan Wendell, Oppression and Victimization: Choice and Responsibility, in
“NAGGING” QUESTIONS: FEMINIST ETHICS IN EVERYDAY LIFE 41, 43 (Dana E. Bushnell ed.,
1995).
138. GRIFFITHS, supra note 127, at 135.
139. Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency: Feminist Perspectives on SelfDirection, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 823-24 (1999).
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ers oneself to be.”140 Abrams describes self-direction as the ability to
formulate goals and plans free of the undue influence of others.141
Similarly, in her book Real Choices: Feminism, Freedom, and the
Limits of Law, philosopher Beth Kiyoko Jamieson suggests that feminists adopt “[t]he Agency Principle—that individuals have the
right to make their own decisions about how to live their lives, that
individuals must be assumed to be capable of making ethical decisions, and that social reprobation (well-intentioned or not) must not
inhibit the decision-making process.”142 A feminist conception of autonomy should include not only the ability to make choices within
one’s personal life, but also the ability to exercise choice within the
larger society. Philosopher Morwenna Griffiths defines autonomy as
having “three interconnected strands: freedom to make oneself, freedom to live that self without fear of the consequences, and freedom to
participate in public decisions that affect oneself.”143
The question of whether women can act autonomously or with
agency within a patriarchal system is complicated significantly by
the presence of domestic violence. Some philosophers have questioned whether women who have been battered are ever capable of
acting autonomously.144 They argue that battering is inherently coercive, creating a context that precludes women who have been battered from being able to exercise free will.145
Others believe that, while women who have been battered are still
capable of exercising some form of autonomy or agency, their ability
to do so is at best compromised and the choices that they make must
be understood as being shaped by the context of the abusive relationship.146 In a coercively controlling relationship, they assume, the
woman is not free to make her own choices or act freely on her own
decisions because she is subject to the will of another.147 These philosophers believe that the autonomy of women who have been battered is undermined because they are too focused on safety to be able
to fully contemplate their choices.148 Law professor Ruth Jones has
gone so far as to suggest that courts should appoint guardians for
women who have been coercively controlled because their judgment
140. Id. at 824.
141. Id. at 830.
142. BETH KIYOKO JAMIESON, REAL CHOICES: FEMINISM, FREEDOM, AND THE LIMITS OF
LAW 7 (2001).
143. GRIFFITHS, supra note 127, at 142.
144. Christman, supra note 125 (summarizing these arguments).
145. Id.
146. MARILYN FRIEDMAN, AUTONOMY, GENDER, POLITICS 142 (2003).
147. Id.; see also Marilyn Friedman, Autonomy, Social Disruption, and Women, in
RELATIONAL AUTONOMY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON AUTONOMY, AGENCY, AND THE SOCIAL
SELF 35, 37 (Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000).
148. FRIEDMAN, supra note 146, at 142.
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has been so impaired and their autonomy so extinguished as to render them incapable of protecting themselves or separating from their
partners.149 Jones writes,
Coercively controlled battered women, immobilized by violence,
need a more aggressive state intervention than those provided by
empowerment-based remedies. Unable to act on their own, these
women require an intervention that permits someone else to act on
their behalf to protect them from their abusers until they can protect themselves.150

Concluding that the agency or autonomy of women who have been
battered is, at best, compromised, a number of scholars have supported the use of mandatory legal interventions to protect these
women.151 They justify these interventions by arguing that women
who have been battered are incapable of making authentic choices to
protect themselves—the choices they would certainly make, these
scholars suggest, if their autonomy had not been undermined by battering.152 As philosopher Marilyn Friedman writes, “Domestic violence . . . itself profoundly undermines a woman’s autonomy. Anything that succeeds in deterring an abuser’s future abusiveness promotes his victim’s long-run autonomy.”153 In the short term, Friedman is willing to trade the immediate decisionmaking authority of
the woman who has been battered for the increased possibility that
she will be able to exercise agency in the long term; as a result, she
argues, “The law should therefore do what it can to prevent men from
abusing their intimate female partners, even if it must do so against
the wishes of the victims and by mandating the victims’ cooperation.”154
These arguments are based on a number of problematic assumptions. These thinkers tend to equate all violent relationships with the
exercise of coercive control and, moreover, to assume that all women
within coercively controlling relationships are so subject to the will of
their partners that they are unable to exercise the ability to choose.
Ruth Jones’ definition of coercive control highlights this assumption.
Women who have been coercively controlled, according to Jones, lack
access to resources and the ability to use them.155 What Jones ignores
is that the resources of a woman who has been battered are not necessarily external. As survivor theory posits, women who have been
149. See Ruth Jones, Guardianship for Coercively Controlled Battered Women: Breaking the Control of the Abuser, 88 GEO. L.J. 605, 628 (2000).
150. Id.
151. Evan Stark, Mandatory Arrest of Batterers: A Reply to Its Critics, 36 AM.
BEHAVIORAL SCI. 651 (1993).
152. FRIEDMAN, supra note 146, at 150.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 151.
155. Jones, supra note 149, at 613.
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battered rely on their own knowledge of their abusers and their innate abilities to survive.156 External resources might not be what a
woman who is being battered believes she needs. The choice not to
access resources, then, is a poor measure of whether a woman is able
to exercise her autonomy. More importantly, Jones’ definition, which
hinges on accessing external resources, seems to link the inability to
choose to the inability to leave the relationship. This formulation ignores the legitimate autonomous choices that some women make to
remain with abusive partners.
Supporters of mandatory interventions focus primarily on the potential for preventing severe physical violence; as Friedman asserts,
“Helping to preserve someone’s very life takes obvious precedence
over respecting her autonomy.”157 The lives of many women who have
been battered are not always at risk, however; lethality occurs too often in intimate relationships, but it does not occur in all of them, or
even in the majority. Further, this argument assumes assume that
legal intervention prevents future abuse and that autonomy will not
be of use to the victim of violence in the course of the legal intervention—that somehow the development of autonomy can wait until a
later date. While domestic violence can certainly involve coercion,
these thinkers assume that the choice not to engage the legal system
is always a coerced choice. Given how these mandatory policies operate to deprive a victim of choice, it is worth questioning whether a
woman who has been battered is ever free of coercion, regardless of
the measures she uses to address the violence she experiences.
Women who have been battered can exercise autonomy and/or
agency. The exercise of autonomy does not require unfettered or entirely consistent choice.158 In fact, John Christman explains, “many
external life situations display such contradictory and confusing characteristics that one’s very survival may demand at least a partially
conflicting set of desires and values.”159 Women who have been battered must be free to make choices that others disagree with or
fail to understand.160 As Morwenna Griffiths writes, “Women want
autonomy; they want to decide the course of their own lives—even
though this may mean that they decide to continue with precisely the
situations that others may define for them as ones in which they
lack autonomy.”161

156. EDWARD W. GONDOLF WITH ELLEN R. FISHER, BATTERED WOMEN AS SURVIVORS:
AN ALTERNATIVE TO TREATING LEARNED HELPLESSNESS 17-18 (1988).
157. FRIEDMAN, supra note 146, at 155.
158. See JAMIESON, supra note 142, at 49.
159. Christman, supra note 128, at 35.
160. JAMIESON, supra note 142, at 172, 220.
161. GRIFFITHS, supra note 127, at 136.
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Kathryn Abrams argues that self-direction may exist even when
others fail to see it, when women resist the institutional forces that
conspire to limit their ability to choose.162 Abrams describes this phenomenon as “resistant self-direction,” explaining that “Women who
resist in these ways may not be seeking to transform society in any
systematic sense, but simply to pursue their own choices and plans in
contexts where doing so evokes serious gender-based challenge.”163
One such situation, argues Abrams, is in the context of a violent relationship. Building on the work of feminist legal scholar Martha Mahoney and the ideas underlying survivor theory, Abrams argues that
the efforts women make to safeguard themselves and their children
within their relationships constitute exercises of self-direction, of
agency, despite the existence of outside constraints on these women’s
ability to freely choose.164
The arguments made by those who support mandatory interventions beg the conclusion that women who have been battered can
rarely, if ever, act autonomously, a problematic assertion given the
primacy of autonomy in the American political and legal systems. Accepting that women who have been battered are incapable of engaging in independent deliberation devalues these women as members of
the political society and invites and justifies what some might characterize as paternalism on their behalf.165 Paternalism reflects a
lack of respect for autonomy and for the individual as a person.166 A
number of the policies adopted to address domestic violence—policies
championed by many advocates for women who have been battered
—are guided by what seems to be patently paternalistic views of
these women as powerless, limited individuals incapable of acting on
their own behalf.167
A better way to characterize the spirit motivating these policy
choices, at least on the part of advocates for women who have been
battered, is that they exemplify maternalism. These policies come
from a well-meaning place—the desire to protect women who have
been battered from further intimidation and violence, from their own
inability to invoke the legal system given their fear of retaliation
162. Abrams, supra note 139, at 832-33.
163. Id. at 832.
164. Id. at 834-35.
165. For a general discussion of paternalism, see Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism,
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
paternalism/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2009).
166. Id. (discussing the Kantian objection to paternalism).
167. Cynthia Daniels, Introduction: The Paradoxes of State Power, in FEMINISTS
NEGOTIATE THE STATE: THE POLITICS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 1, 1 (Cynthia R. Daniels et
al. eds., 1997) (“As mandatory arrest policies illustrate, a state empowered to protect women may also have power to victimize women. Many victories won by feminists . . . have
been won at the expense of reinforcing traditional patriarchal assumptions that women are
unable or unwilling to take care of themselves.”).
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from their abusers, from losing their children or economic benefits in
unfair mediations. This maternalism is born of advocates’ experiences with a legal system that has too often failed to safeguard the
rights and needs of women who have been battered and their belief
that mandatory interventions are instrumental in ensuring that the
system treats cases of domestic violence seriously.
But maternalism is no better than paternalism in that it assumes
that women who have been battered are incapable of considering the
full range of possibilities and deprives them of the ability to make
choices for themselves, based on their own goals, values, beliefs, and
understanding of their situations. Maternalism undermines the autonomy of women who have been battered. Exercises of maternalism
to justify the implementation of mandatory policies are fundamentally at odds with one of the foundational goals of the battered women’s
movement—empowerment.
IV. WHY EMPOWERMENT MATTERS
If, as most scholars agree, domestic violence is characterized by a
power imbalance between the parties,168 restoring power to women
who have been battered should be a priority when crafting domestic
violence law and policy.169 For that reason, empowerment has been a
central, though not always well-defined, theme in the battered women’s movement.170 In her seminal work, Women and Male Violence:
The Visions and Struggles of the Battered Women’s Movement, social
work professor Susan Schechter describes empowerment as “the illusive word that embodies the sense of controlling one’s life and circumstances.”171 For Schechter, empowerment is
[A] process through which women, experts about their own lives,
learn to know their strength. “Empowerment” combines ideas
about internalizing personal and collective power and validating
women’s personal experiences as politically oppressive rather than
self-caused or “crazy.” In a feminist political context, empowerment signifies standing together as a community just as it means
168. See, e.g., Imbrogno, supra note 68, at 860; Johnson et al., supra note 68, at 1027.
169. Noël Bridget Busch & Deborah Valentine, Empowerment Practice: A Focus on
Battered Women, 15 AFFILIA 82, 83 (2000) (discussing the theory of empowerment).
170. See, e.g., id. at 82-84; see also DUTTON, supra note 61, at 129; ELAINE J. LAWLESS,
WOMEN ESCAPING VIOLENCE: EMPOWERMENT THROUGH NARRATIVE 156 (2001); Kathleen
O. Corcoran & James C. Melamed, From Coercion to Empowerment: Spousal Abuse and
Mediation, 7 MEDIATION Q. 303, 309-10 (1990); M. Joan McDermott & James Garofalo,
When Advocacy for Domestic Violence Victims Backfires: Types and Sources of Victim Disempowerment, 10 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1245, 1248 (2004); Einat Peled et al., Choice
and Empowerment for Battered Women Who Stay: Toward a Constructivist Model, 45
SOCIAL WORK 9, 10 (2000); David M. Zlotnick, Empowering the Battered Woman: The Use of
Criminal Contempt Sanctions to Enforce Civil Protection Orders, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1153,
1184 (1995).
171. SCHECHTER, supra note 19, at 320.
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supportively enabling a person to take risks. Its premise is to turn
individual defeats into victories through giving women tools to better control their lives and joining in collective struggle.172

Other definitions of empowerment echo the language of autonomy
and agency. Empowerment has been described as “a process of enabling people to master their environments and achieve selfdetermination.”173 The goal of empowering social work interventions,
according to social work professor and researcher Einat Peled and
her colleagues, should be “to allow clients control over their own lives
and the ability to make decisions for themselves—that is, to provide
them the conditions to balance rights and needs and thus make
choices.”174 Empowerment is important not only in a theoretical
sense, but also because it may have concrete positive consequences
for women who have been battered. Researchers Lauren Bennett
Cattaneo and Lisa A. Goodman have found that empowering court
experiences predict long-term improvements in depression and quality of life for women who have been battered.175
In the world of services for women who have been battered, however, empowerment is often defined by what service providers can
give to women who have been battered—particularly, the provider’s
ability to reinstate choice for women whose options have been restricted by their partners.176 Too often, though, those choices have
been constrained by what service providers, advocates, and policy
makers deem acceptable alternatives for women who have been battered—particularly, separating from their abusive partners and engaging the criminal justice system.177
In “giving” the woman options, certain possibilities, like engaging
in mediation or dropping criminal charges, may never come up for
discussion. If those options are raised, they are presented in a manner meant (consciously or unconsciously) to dissuade the woman from
seeing them as viable alternatives. Certainly this is the case with
mediation. While few advocates forbid women from participating in
the process, many, if not most, describe mediation in a manner that
makes it clear that the advocate believes the process to be at best antithetical to the woman’s interests, and at worst a danger to her safe-

172. Id. at 109.
173. Peled et al., supra note 170, at 10.
174. Id. at 12.
175. Lauren Bennett Cattaneo & Lisa A. Goodman, Through the Lens of Therapeutic
Jurisprudence: The Relationship Between Empowerment in the Court System and Wellbeing for Intimate Partner Violence Victims, J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE (prepublished May
8, 2009, DOI: 10.1177/0886260509334282), available at http://jiv.sagepub.com/cgi/
content/abstract/0886260509334282v1.
176. McDermott & Garofalo, supra note 170, at 1248.
177. Goodmark, supra note 42, at 19-21.
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ty.178 Relying on the advocate’s expertise and experience with the legal system, a woman who might otherwise be interested in attempting to mediate is easily steered towards other alternatives.
Restricting choice is congruent with a definition of empowerment
that calls for “giving” women choices or “letting” women choose
among the options presented. In that context, empowerment would
not require that the woman be permitted to generate options for herself or that all choices be presented, only that some choice be given
and that the woman be free to select from what is offered. But empowerment must mean more than simply substituting advocates or the
state for the abusive partner as the arbiter of choices for women who
have been battered. Empowerment should be read as consistent with
autonomy or agency—as self-direction, self-determination, enabling
the woman who has been battered not only to make choices, but to
define the options for herself, regardless of how others would evaluate those options. A belief in the centrality of empowerment for
women who have been battered should prevent advocates from embracing mandatory policies.
Empowerment is a central feminist theme and was a key concept
in the early battered women’s movement. But as the state became
more involved in the lives of women who had been battered, empowerment found itself competing with other goals, particularly victim
safety and offender accountability.179 As one woman wrote many
years ago,
It has been over a decade since the battered women-mothers
planted the seeds of the domestic violence movement. Something
unsettling and unanticipated has occurred; a movement which began as the battered woman’s is less and less hers. Rather than

178. See, e.g., Drew, supra note 68, at 19-20 (outlining safeguards that should be in
place before mediating a case involving domestic violence); Fischer et al., supra note 68, at
2173 (contending that mediation is never appropriate when a culture of battering exists in
a relationship and, acknowledging that such cases will likely be mediated nonetheless, offering a number of conditions that must be present before mediation in such cases should
proceed); Johnson et al., supra note 68, at 1049 (arguing that mediation should never be
mandated and that existing safeguards like screening and assessment are inadequate);
Knowlton & Muhlhauser, supra note 69, at 267-68 (arguing that until mediators have appropriate training in domestic violence, cases involving violence should never be mediated).
179. David Ford and Mary Jean Regoli note that these goals need not be at odds.
“[E]mpowering the victim by allowing her to make choices in the prosecution process (i.e.,
whether to drop charges) can increase her security.” Ford & Regoli, supra note 57, at 159.
Similarly, Kathleen Ferraro and Lucille Pope link safety and empowerment, arguing that
“Any legal or policy changes that increase the power of police without simultaneously striving for the empowerment of women will have the potential to decrease rather than improve
the level of women’s safety.” Ferraro & Pope, supra note 22, at 120.
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true empowerment for battered women, the original political ideal,
we battered women could be swept away . . . .180

In the case of mandatory interventions like mandatory arrest, nodrop prosecution, and mediation bans, empowerment has certainly
taken a back seat, to the decided detriment of some women who have
been battered.
V. THE LAW AS A DISEMPOWERING FORCE
Noellee Mowatt’s experience with the legal system highlights the
tension between mandatory interventions and autonomy and empowerment. Mowatt called police in Ontario in December 2007, alleging
that her boyfriend, Christopher Harbin, punched her, grabbed her,
and stabbed at her feet with a knife.181 When she failed to appear for
his trial in March 2008, a warrant was issued for her arrest.182 In
April 2008, Mowatt, nine months pregnant with Harbin’s child, was
jailed for a week without bail until she gave testimony in his trial.183
The court was well within the law in issuing the warrant, enabling
prosecutors to secure Mowatt’s testimony. But what did jailing Mowatt achieve? Harbin was acquitted in May 2008, largely because of
questions about Mowatt’s credibility after Mowatt recanted her allegations of abuse on the stand.184 Mowatt has vowed, “I’m never call180. Merle H. Weiner, From Dollars to Sense: A Critique of Government Funding for
the Battered Women’s Shelter Movement, 9 LAW & INEQ. 185, 237 (1991) (citing Stafne, Reclaiming Our Movement: A Focus on Formerly Battered Women (mimeograph available from
the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence)); see also N. Zoe Hilton, Introduction, in
LEGAL RESPONSES TO WIFE ASSAULT: CURRENT TRENDS AND EVALUATION 5 (N. Zoe Hilton
ed., 1993) (“When evaluating legal innovations, it is important not to lose the voice of the
victims.”).
181. Michele Henry, Pregnant Teen Out on Bail, TORONTO STAR, Apr. 12, 2008, at A6.
182. Id. A recent bill introduced in North Carolina would fine victims of violence like
Mowatt who call the police but later drop charges or refuse to cooperate. House Bill 1212,
sponsored by Representatives Harold Brubaker and Pat B. Hurley, would allow the court
to impose a fee of $100 on any complainant “who has caused the issuance of a criminal
warrant or summons but subsequently drops the charges or refuses to cooperate with the
prosecution of the case, in order to compensate the court for the time and expense of serving the warrant or summons, for the scheduling of the case on the criminal docket, and for
related expenses.” H.R. 1212, 2009 Leg. Sess. (N.C. 2009).
183. Henry, supra note 181; Michele Henry, Pregnant Woman ‘Never Calling the Police
Again,’ TORONTO STAR, Apr. 8, 2008, at A10. Similarly, in a recent case in Maryland, prosecutors requested and a district court judge granted a body attachment warrant for a victim who checked in with prosecutors on the morning of her partner’s criminal trial but later left the courthouse and was not present when the case was called. Prosecutors requested
that the judge continue the case and issue a warrant for the victim that would last until
the next court date, approximately six weeks later—despite the fact that the victim was at
the time pregnant with the defendant’s child and would be very close to term at the end of
that six week period. Interview with Ginger Robinson, Assistant Public Defender, in Baltimore, MD (Mar. 10, 2009).
184. Chris Wattie, Pregnant Teen Changes Testimony About Boyfriend, NATIONAL
POST,
Apr.
22,
2008,
available
at
http://www.canada.com/topics/news/
national/story.html?id=6844a587-1ef8-4c8c-b6fa-715c93859540.
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ing the police again—even if I’m dying, I’m not going to call them.”185
In seeking to hold Harbin accountable and protect Mowatt, the legal
system achieved neither goal. By usurping Mowatt’s choice about
whether to engage the criminal system to protect her, the system instead drove her away, all but ensuring that Mowatt will avoid
state intervention and any future abuse will go unpunished by the
legal system.186
Meredith Bell has a similar story. On July 8, 2002, police found
Bell and her boyfriend, Adrian Spraggins, arguing in the parking lot
of her workplace.187 Although Bell had not called the police for assistance, when they arrived she described how Spraggins had threatened her repeatedly, pushed her down, and forced her and her son into a car with him.188 Spraggins then drove her to work; when Bell
grabbed the keys and left the car, Spraggins chased her and threatened to hit her.189 Witnesses called the police.190
What precipitated this incident? Spraggins had been violent towards Bell in the past. On July 8, 2002, Bell was scheduled to testify
against him in another domestic violence case, and the threats
Spraggins made that day were tied to her testimony.191 The irony,
though, is that Bell was not testifying willingly in the matter—she
had been subpoenaed to appear.192 Bell also did not testify willingly
in the trial on the July 8 incident, where Spraggins was charged with
witness intimidation, kidnapping, aggravated burglary, and domestic
violence. Approximately one month before that trial, Bell sent a letter
185. Henry, supra note 183, at A10.
186. Recognizing the complex considerations and emotions that accompany the prosecution of an intimate partner, California recently passed legislation exempting domestic
violence victims from being incarcerated when held in contempt for refusal to testify in
court. SB 1356, signed by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, does not preclude prosecution
for contempt, however. In response to that bill, California Assembly Member Bill Emmerson introduced legislation that would allow the court to require that a victim of a domestic
violence crime who refuses to testify against her abuser attend a session of counseling; a
hearing after the counseling session is required to determine whether the victim’s choice
not to testify was made “freely and voluntarily and without coercion.” A.B. 1248, 2009 Assem. 10th Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009). While some advocates viewed the bill as an opportunity to
safety plan with the victim, law professor Elizabeth MacDowell argues that the statute ignores the coercion victims experience at the hands of the state and “removes the appearance of state coercion when victims testify.” E-mail from Professor Elizabeth MacDowell,
Visiting Assistant Clinical Professor, Chapman University School of Law, to Leigh Goodmark, Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law (Mar. 12, 2009) (on file
with author).
187. State v. Spraggins, No. 82170, 2003 WL 22971050, at *2 (Ohio App. 8 Dist. Dec.
18, 2003).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1-2.
192. Id. at 1. Some have argued that this use of the subpoena power is appropriate,
stating that “it is a good idea to subpoena victims, because this shows that the victim has
no control over the process.” Cahn, supra note 47, at 168.
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asking that the charges be dismissed, stating that “she never had any
intention of testifying against Spraggins, that he did not intimidate
her, and that she never wanted him to be prosecuted.”193
At trial, Bell testified that her statement to the police, in which
she recounted the events of July 8, was false and that she lied to police because she was angry with Spraggins.194 Bell stated that she
loved Spraggins, that he helped her to support her child, who was not
biologically his, and that she did not want him to get into trouble.195
The trial judge responded acidly to the testimony that prosecutors
forced Bell to give: “So let me see if I’ve got this all straight. We’re
here trying this case because you are a liar. Is that correct?”196
Spraggins unsuccessfully appealed his conviction on the witness intimidation count, arguing that the judge’s statements prejudiced
the jury.197
While Spraggins’ claim on appeal was not persuasive, the refusal
of prosecutors to allow Bell to choose whether to proceed, coupled
with the judge’s treatment of Bell on the witness stand, may have
guaranteed that Bell will not use the system again.198 As one Colorado judge cautioned in a case where prosecutors attempted to prosecute a woman for complicity, alleging that she contacted her partner
in violation of a criminal protective order that she did not want and
repeatedly and unsuccessfully asked prosecutors to dismiss, “the nature of the prosecution does not alter the victim’s status as a victim
nor, through some sort of legal alchemy, permit her to be exploited by
a bullying prosecutor rather than a bullying spouse.”199
The battered women’s movement endorsed the policy choices that
led to these results for Nicole Mowatt and Meredith Bell—policies
that actively prioritize safety and accountability over autonomy for
every woman who has been battered. Championing mandatory arrest, no-drop prosecution, and mediation bans has helped to make the

193. Spraggins, 2003 WL 22971050, at *2.
194. Id. at 2.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 3.
197. Id.
198. Id. In a different twist, a Massachusetts prosecutor was suspended from the practice of law for six months for lying in court to protect her boyfriend from prosecution, despite expressing her unwillingness to participate at every stage of the legal proceedings.
Fawn Balliro’s boyfriend blackened her eye and split her lip after he saw her speaking to
another man in a bar. Balliro did not call the police, bailed her boyfriend out of jail, told
the prosecutor she did not want to press charges, and gave inconsistent testimony during
his trial. Charges against him were dismissed. Balliro’s suspension was a more serious penalty than the two-month suspension given to a Massachusetts lawyer convicted of assaulting his wife in 2002. See Kathleen Burge, Prosecutor’s Punishment Angers Abuse Victims’ Advocates, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 29, 2009, at Reg 3.
199. People v. Caldarella, No. 07CV174 (Dist. Ct. Colo. 2007); see also HILTON, supra
note 180, at 4.

2009]

AUTONOMY FEMINISM

35

law a disempowering force in the lives of women who have been battered.200 That choice is problematic on two levels. First, it assumes
that these policies will actually enhance safety, despite the lack of
evidence of their effectiveness at the time of their adoption and, at
best, conflicting evidence today. Secondly, it assumes that all women
who have been battered would choose safety—defined as separation
from an abusive partner—or accountability over autonomy.
Debates continue to rage about the efficacy of these mandatory
policies. While Sherman’s initial studies are still used to justify mandatory arrest, more recent research, including Sherman’s own, paints
a much more nuanced picture of the usefulness of arrest in domestic
violence cases.201 Similarly, the data on the link between prosecution
and repeat violence is equivocal.202 Although recent studies support
the hypothesis that mandatory arrest laws increase the number of offenders arrested for violence against their partners, that research
has not established a link between higher arrest rates and safety or
accountability.203 Moreover, the number of successful prosecutions
has not increased in jurisdictions that implemented mandatory arrest laws; in fact, fewer cases were prosecuted in mandatory arrest
jurisdictions.204 As Professor Linda Mills argues, “At worst, the criminal justice system increases violence against women. At best, it has
little or no effect.”205
The debate about whether mediation helps or harms women who
have been battered is similarly inconclusive. Supporters of mediation
claim that women find mediation empowering, that it enhances
women’s ability to stand up for themselves, and that it is vastly pref-

200. HILTON, supra note 180, at 4.
201. N. Zoe Hilton, Police Intervention and Public Opinion, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO
WIFE ASSAULT: CURRENT TRENDS AND EVALUATION 45 (N. Zoe Hilton ed., 1993) (summarizing research); Ruttenberg, supra note 39, at 194 n. 122 (summarizing research); Sherman
et al., supra note 34, at 680 (summarizing research).
202. Ford & Regoli, supra note 57, at 130-31 (explaining that arrest studies did not examine impact of prosecution and arguing that research did not support arguments that
prosecution would protect victims of violence); Mills, supra note 49, at 567-68 (summarizing research); but see John Wooldredge, Convicting and Incarcerating Felony Offenders of
Intimate Assault and the Odds of New Assault Charges, 35 J. CRIM. JUST. 379, 386 (2007)
(finding that convictions and jail sentences were related to significantly lower likelihoods
of recharging for criminal assault).
203. David Hirschel et al., Domestic Violence and Mandatory Arrest Laws: To What Extent Do They Influence Police Arrest Decisions?, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 255, 297-98
(2008).
204. Nina W. Tarr, Employment and Economic Security for Victims of Domestic Abuse,
16 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 371, 389 (2007); see also Mary Ann Dutton, The Dynamics of
Domestic Violence: Understanding the Response from Battered Women, FLA. B.J., October
1994, at 26 (“[E]ven successful criminal prosecution is not adequate to protect a battered
woman from being repeatedly injured or even killed once the batterer has been released.”).
205. LINDA G. MILLS, INSULT TO INJURY: RETHINKING OUR RESPONSES TO INTIMATE
ABUSE 6 (2003).

36

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:1

erable to litigating contested family cases.206 Litigation, they argue,
makes angry and hostile parents more violent,207 relies on attorneys
(when there are actually attorneys involved, which is increasingly
rare) and judges with no training in domestic violence to protect
women who have been battered,208 is both financially and emotionally costly,209 and undermines the self-determination of women who
have been battered.210
Just as proponents of mediation have urged skeptics not to compare the best litigation with the worst mediation and find mediation
wanting,211 mediation’s champions tend to juxtapose the worst litigation against the most successful mediation.212 The argument assumes
that one of these avenues for dispute resolution must be seen as unequivocally better for all women who have been battered, a conclusion
that is impossible to draw. From an autonomy perspective, what is
essential is that women who have been battered have the opportunity
to learn (in an unbiased manner) about all of their options and are
given the chance to make choices as to which option better serves
their individual needs.213
Assume for a moment, however, that the data about such policies
was unambiguous—that mandatory policies could be clearly and causally linked to increased offender accountability or greater safety for
women who have been battered. Would such policies then be justified? Not if we hearken back to the original goals of the battered
women’s movement and prioritize autonomy as we should. These policies essentialize women who have been battered by assuming that
all women would choose state intervention if they had the unfettered
ability to make that choice, and that the coercion these women experience prevents them from exercising the “rational” choice embodied
in the mandatory policy.
The emphasis on coercion in understanding the behavior of women who have been battered is in part responsible for these assump206. See, e.g., Julia Alanen, When Human Rights Conflict: Mediating International Parental Kidnapping Disputes Involving the Domestic Violence Defense, 40 U. MIAMI INTERAM. L. REV. 49, 107-08 (2008); Jo Daugherty Bailey & Susan P. Robbins, Couple Empowerment in Divorce: A Comparison of Mediated and Nonmediated Outcomes, 22 CONFLICT RES.
Q. 453, 454 (2005); Corcoran & Melamed, supra note 170, at 310-11; Ellis, supra note 102,
at 1013; Schepard, supra note 67, at 421-22.
207. Ver Steegh, supra note 67, at 162-63.
208. See Knowlton & Muhlhauser, supra note 69, at 267 (contending that “[welltrained] mediators are much more likely to validate the parties[‘] feelings and perceptions
and they provide a better balance of power among the parties than any courtroom process
that I have observed in my fifteen years of clinical practice”).
209. See Ellis, supra note 102, at 1019-20.
210. Id. at 1022-23.
211. Zylstra, supra note 67, at 259.
212. See generally Ellis, supra note 102.
213. Ver Steegh, supra note 67, at 204.
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tions. But coercion—the pressure to make a particular decision—does
not render every choice involuntary. Consider the case of Meredith
Bell. Certainly her request that prosecutors drop the criminal case
against her boyfriend was coerced in the sense that she was under
pressure not to testify against him.214 But did that pressure necessarily prevent her from making a rational decision not to cooperate with
prosecutors? Such a position assumes that in the face of threats,
women lose their abilities to consider, evaluate, and decide—that
they lose their reason. It is just as possible that in the face of a threat
a woman could look at the protection the system has offered in the
past, the resources she has to draw on, and her goals, priorities, and
relationships, and decide that not testifying could, in fact, decrease
the level of threat she faces and improve her life.215 The operation of a
mandatory policy, designed and implemented not with Meredith Bell
in mind, but based on a stereotypical victim whose choices are consistent with the legal system’s goals and objectives, should not deprive
her of that choice.216
Mandatory policies also ignore the profound impact that race,
class, sexual orientation, immigration status, and other identities
may have on women’s decisions to invoke formal systems. Many
women of color, for example, are profoundly ambivalent about involving the criminal system in their lives, given their negative past experiences with police and prosecutors217 and concerns about subjecting
men of color to further control by the state.218 Lesbians may be reluctant to engage the criminal justice system for fear of being outed219 or
mistreated by police and prosecutors who assume that violence between women must be a “cat fight,”220 or that a “butch” lesbian must

214. State v. Spraggins, No. 82170, 2003 WL 22971050, at 1 (Ohio App. 8 Dist. Dec. 18,
2003).
215. McDermott & Garofalo, supra note 170, at 1252-53 (summarizing the reasons why
women who have been battered might not be interested in cooperating with the criminal system).
216. As psychologist Michelle Fine reminds, “Who decides who needs what? And what
happens when the answers diverge dramatically by race, class, age, experience, and politics?” Michelle Fine, The Politics of Research and Activism: Violence Against Women, in
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: THE BLOODY FOOTPRINTS 279, 285 (Pauline B. Bart & Eileen
Geil Moran eds., 1993).
217. SUSAN L. MILLER, VICTIMS AS OFFENDERS: THE PARADOX OF WOMEN’S VIOLENCE
IN RELATIONSHIPS 8 (2005); BETH E. RICHIE, COMPELLED TO CRIME: THE GENDER
ENTRAPMENT OF BLACK BATTERED WOMEN 96 (1996).
218. Marilyn Yarbrough & Crystal Bennett, Cassandra and the “Sistahs”: The Peculiar
Treatment of African American Women in the Myth of Women as Liars, 3 J. GENDER RACE
& JUST. 625, 643 (2000).
219. JANICE L. RISTOCK, NO MORE SECRETS: VIOLENCE IN LESBIAN RELATIONSHIPS iv
(2002); Kristen Kuehnle & Anne Sullivan, Gay and Lesbian Victimization: Reporting Factors in Domestic Violence and Bias Incidents, 30 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 85, 87-88 (2003).
220. Sandra E. Lundy, Abuse That Dare Not Speak Its Name: Assisting Victims of Lesbian and Gay Domestic Violence in Massachusetts, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 273, 296-97 (1993);
RISTOCK, supra note 219, at 99.

38

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:1

always be the aggressor.221 Low income women may not be able to afford the arrest and prosecution of their partners;222 the economic resources their partners provide might be more important than a cessation of the battering at a particular point in time. Immigrant women,
particularly those who are undocumented or whose partners are undocumented, may fear that involvement in the criminal system will
lead to deportation, depriving them of economic, emotional, extended
family, or parenting support.223
Some of these same women may want to use mediation to resolve
problems precisely because they are unwilling to resort to the criminal system—a solution denied them by mandatory policies against
mediation in cases involving domestic violence. Such decisions are far
from irrational. They are calculated choices made based on past experiences and with intimate knowledge of their partners, their resources, their political views, their family concerns—in short, based
on the lives that they seek to fashion. The state should not have the
power to deny that choice to women who have been battered.
How far are advocates willing to take mandatory interventions into the lives of women who have been battered in the name of safety?
A look at laws requiring physicians to report evidence of domestic violence to law enforcement and/or other state agencies may be instructive. A number of states mandate that health care professionals
report injuries resulting from criminal activity or inflicted by specific
kinds of weapons to law enforcement. A smaller subset of these states
requires that health care professionals report injuries resulting from
violence by an intimate partner.224 Those laws generally require physicians and other health care professionals to inform police of injuries
resulting from criminal acts, including domestic violence.225 The original justification for California’s law was to ensure that all criminal

221. Leigh Goodmark, When Is A Battered Woman Not A Battered Woman? When She
Fights Back, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75, 109 (2008).
222. Barbara J. Hart, The Legal Road to Freedom, in BATTERING AND FAMILY
THERAPY: A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE 18 (1993), available at http://www.mincava.umn.edu/
documents/hart/hart.html#id2372872. As Donna Coker explains, “Rather than the result of
batterer intimidation or persuasion, women’s cooperation with mandatory policies, particularly with prosecution, is often a product of their access to material resources . . . . Cooperation with prosecution often requires women to take time off from work, to acquire transportation and childcare, or to make other sometimes costly and difficult arrangements.”
Coker, supra note 41, at 840.
223. See Leslye E. Orloff et al., Battered Immigrant Women’s Willingness to Call for
Help and Police Response, 13 UCLA. WOMEN’S L.J. 43, 43 (2003) (discussing a study finding
that battered immigrant women were unlikely to call police); see also Goodmark, supra
note 42, at 37.
224. Ariella Hyman, Mandatory Reporting of Domestic Violence by Health Care Providers: A Policy Paper, Nov. 3, 1997, available at http://endabuse.forumone.com/health/
mandatoryreporting/policypaper.pdf.
225. Mordini, supra note 16, at 324.
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activity came to the attention of police;226 in 1994, domestic violence
was specifically listed as a crime to be reported at the urging of children’s groups and law enforcement.227 Former Kentucky Attorney
General Steven Beshear has opined that the duty under Kentucky’s
reporting law is absolute, not alleviated by treatment, therapy, or the
victim’s refusal to press charges or leave the home.228 If the adult who
is the subject of the report refuses to allow state officials to enter her
home after such a report, the court may issue a search warrant permitting entry onto the premises.229
Some reporting laws abrogate the physician/patient privilege and
allow for the admission of statements and other information revealed
during examination and diagnosis of the patient.230 Colorado added
its domestic violence provision in 1995;231 the Colorado courts later
upheld the abrogation of the physician/patient privilege, explaining
that the legislature could abrogate the privilege when an overriding
public policy need for the information to be made public existed. The
Court held that such provisions struck an appropriate balance between the need to protect victims of domestic violence and the desire
to encourage them to seek treatment free of fear or embarrassment.232 New Hampshire’s reporting law provides an exception to reporting if the victim is over the age of eighteen and objects to the release of the information, unless she has been treated for a gunshot or
other serious bodily injury.233
These reporting laws seem to be logical extensions of the philosophy that mandatory interventions benefit victims of violence because
they ensure that law enforcement will have knowledge of the commission of domestic violence crimes and the opportunity to ensure
that perpetrators are held accountable for their actions. Abrogating
the physician/patient privilege to require reporting simply prioritizes
victim safety and offender accountability over victim privacy and autonomy—the same calculation made with other mandatory policies.
Yet advocates for victims of violence roundly condemn such laws.234
226. 36 Ops. Cal. Att’y. Gen. 200 (1960).
227. Mia M. McFarlane, Mandatory Reporting of Domestic Violence: An Inappropriate
Response for New York Health Care Professionals, 17 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 13-14 (1999).
228. Ops. Ky. Att’y Gen. 83-187 (1983).
229. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 209.030(8) (West 2008).
230. See, e.g., People v. Covington, 19 P.3d 15, 22-23 (Colo. 2001) (holding that Colorado’s mandatory reporting statute abrogates physician/patient privilege); Ops. Ky. Att’y
Gen. 83-187 (1983) (holding that Kentucky’s mandatory reporting statute abrogates physician/patient privilege).
231. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-36-135 (West 2008).
232. Covington, 19 P.3d 15, at 22.
233. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 631:6 (West 2008).
234. See, e.g., Virginia Daire, The Case Against Mandatory Reporting of Domestic Violence Injuries, 74 FLA. B.J. 78, 78 (2000) (writing on behalf of the Florida Coalition Against
Domestic Violence).
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Ariella Hyman has argued that “there is ample reason to believe that
mandatory reporting of all injuries due to domestic violence
represents a threat to the health and safety of survivors of domestic
violence.”235 Hyman argues that such laws deter victims from seeking
medical treatment, expose women who have been battered to the risk
of retaliation by their abusers, and undermine patient autonomy.
Hyman quoted one woman involved in a support group for women
who had been battered as “dismayed at being ‘treated as if they were
infants and not able to make up their own minds whether to report to
the police.’ ”236 For these reasons, the Family Violence Prevention
Fund, a leading voice in the movement against domestic violence, opposes mandatory physician reporting of domestic violence injuries.237
Looking at such policies through the lens of autonomy, it is difficult to find any appreciable difference between physician reporting
laws and other laws that mandate the involvement or noninvolvement of the state in domestic violence matters. Yet, where there is
general agreement that mandatory physician reporting laws are disempowering, there is no such consensus about mandatory arrest
laws. How is the taking the choice to engage the legal system from
the hands of the victim any different when a physician makes the
phone call to police?
One could argue that physician reporting laws go a step further
than previous policies by usurping the woman’s decision about
whether to involve law enforcement at all. A woman who has been
battered is deprived of the choice to involve the police in the first instance if her doctor is required to report; his duty negates any decision she might have made about whether to call the police during or
after the incident.238 In jurisdictions embracing mandatory policies,
however, the same consequences stem from a phone call made by a
neighbor as from a phone call made by a doctor: mandatory arrest
and victimless prosecution. While advocates have grave and warranted concerns about creating disincentives for women who have
been battered to seek medical treatment, the difference between phy-

235. Hyman, supra note 224, at 14.
236. Id. at 6, n. 5. The American Medical Association also opposes mandatory reporting
of intimate partner abuse among adults, stating that such policies “violate basic tenets of
medical ethics.” American Medical Association, AMA Data on Violence Between Intimates,
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/no-index/about-ama/13577.shtml (last visited
Oct. 27, 2009).
237. Hyman, supra note 224, at 6, n.5. Hyman’s paper was published by the Family Violence Prevention Fund.
238. The choice not to call the police is often based on calculations about the effectiveness of police response, the woman’s knowledge of her partner, or concerns about what involving the police could mean for the woman’s safety. As one woman in Hyman’s study explained, “She [the physician] wanted to call the police and I said, ‘No, no he is the police.’ ”
Id. at 2.
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sician reporting laws and other mandatory interventions is negligible, particularly in terms of the impact on women’s autonomy.
Mandatory policies are disempowering because they deprive women who have been battered of the ability to control their use of tools
like arrest, prosecution, and mediation. Women who have been battered use the legal system to attempt to regain control from their abusers.239 Researcher David Ford has described how women who have
been battered use the threat of prosecution as a “power resource,” a
tool that can be deployed to equalize the power imbalances within the
relationship.240 Women call police not only because they want their
partners arrested, but also to interrupt the battering incident or to
show their partners that they are willing to reach out to others and
to invoke the power of the state to stop the violence.241 Women participate in prosecutions against their partners not only because they
want those partners punished, but also to teach them a lesson, to secure counseling for the battering partner, or to get support payments,
for example.242 Similarly, women drop charges for a variety of reasons
beyond intimidation by their partners: because the violence has
stopped, he has agreed to counseling, or he has agreed to divorce.243
The instrumental use of arrest and prosecution empowers the woman
who has been battered in the negotiation of the terms of her relationship with her partner. Ford warns, however, that “criminal justice
options are victim power resources only if she can control the manner
in which they are brought to bear on her mate.”244
The obvious problem with Ford’s caution is that the legal system
and the police and prosecutors who work within that system may
have very different objectives for arrest and prosecution. System actors often view their roles not as facilitating the woman’s instrumental use of the system, but as upholding the laws against domestic violence and societal mores reflected in those laws, regardless of, and
sometimes despite, the wishes of individual women.245 The system is
239. Jo-Anne Wemmers & Marie-Marthe Cousineau, Victim Needs and Conjugal Violence: Do Victims Want Decision-Making Power?, 22 CONFLICT RES. Q. 493, 498-500 (2005).
240. David A. Ford, Prosecution as a Victim Power Resource: A Note on Empowering
Women in Violent Conjugal Relationships, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 313, 318 (1991).
241. Smith, supra note 22, at 1399; see also Ferraro & Pope, supra note 22, at 108 (arguing that many women call police not to end their relationships but simply to end the violence).
242. Ford, supra note 240, at 324-25; see also Ferraro & Pope, supra note 22, at 108
(explaining that women engage in prosecution to get help for the abuser rather than imprisonment); Ford & Regoli, supra note 57, at 137 (citing punishment, coercion into treatment,
and empowerment as reasons that women seek prosecution and referencing study showing that
only 16% of women ranked protection as primary expected outcome of filing charges).
243. Ford, supra note 240, at 326; see also Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa, Introduction, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE vii, xvii (1992).
244. Ford, supra note 240, at 318.
245. Angela Davis describes this divergence of goals in the story of her meeting with a
prosecutor. Davis, on behalf of the defendant, had gotten the complaining witness to sign a
statement asking the prosecutor to drop the charges. “When I showed the statement to the
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simply not the woman’s to use—there are too many other actors with
competing interests for such a practice to be possible.246
Opponents of mediation justify their position by claiming that the
goals of mediation cannot be achieved in cases involving domestic violence.247 But Ford’s insight is important in the mediation context as
well. Whether the goals of mediation can be met in cases involving
domestic violence depends on who defines those goals. If the goals are
those generally articulated by the legal system—cheaper, less adversarial, more likely to promote agreement248—opponents of mediation
are indeed correct that the goals may be difficult to meet. But the
goals of the woman who has been battered may be very different than
those of the system. She might choose to use mediation as a space
within which to express her anger at her partner—an anger which, if
expressed during an adversarial proceeding, could alienate the judge
and damage her case.249 She might choose to confront her partner
with the consequences of his actions—the end of the relationship, the
distribution of property, and the determination of custody rights. She
might use mediation to show her partner that he no longer has the
ability to control her.
Mediation could be a boon to the woman who has been battered
regardless of whether an agreement is ever reached, notwithstanding
that reaching an agreement is the usual measure of success for mediation. Rather than reinforcing a power imbalance between the parties, mediation could serve as a power restorative, providing a safe
space within which the woman who has been battered could make
demands and have them heard and ratified by a neutral third party,
and in so doing, recapture her power. Mediation, too, could serve as a
prosecutor, she was furious. She told me that she didn’t care what Mrs. Jefferson wanted
and that it wasn’t up to Mrs. Jefferson to decide how the case was prosecuted. The prosecutor went on to say that she had a duty to fight domestic violence and that she was going to
fulfill that duty, with or without Mrs. Jefferson’s help. . . . It was as if the victim was ruining her case and impeding her fight against domestic violence. Instead of viewing the victim as a person who was badly hurt and in need of assistance and compassion, the prosecutor seemed to view her as the enemy—someone standing in the path of her battle against
domestic violence.” ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR 67-68 (2007).
246. This assumes, of course, that any of those actors have clearly articulated their
goals. In 1993, Ronald Roesch, Stephen D. Hart, and Laurene J. Wilson noted, “In fact, as
embarrassing as it is to admit, it appears that we as a society have not made the goals of
our interventions sufficiently explicit.” Ronald Roesch, Stephen D. Hart & Laurene J. Wilson, Legal Responses to Wife Assault: Future Prospects for Intervention and Evaluation, in
LEGAL RESPONSES TO WIFE ASSAULT: CURRENT TRENDS AND EVALUATION 289, 295-96 (N.
Zoe Hilton ed., 1993). I believe this to still be the case. But even if society’s goals were
clearly articulated, to the extent that they differ from or clash with the woman’s goals for
the intervention, it is her goals that should be paramount.
247. See supra Section II.B (discussing the many problems and concerns in mediating
domestic violence cases).
248. See sources cited supra note 67.
249. Goodmark, supra note 76, at 46.
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“power resource,” but only if the woman who has been battered has
the ability to control the terms upon which it is going to be used.
Is it realistic to believe that women who have been battered will
be able to control these systems? We will never know if women do not
have the ability to make nonconforming choices. A guiding principle
for domestic violence law and policy that seeks to honor the autonomy of women who have been battered must be to enact only policies
that women can control. If we truly value the empowerment of women who have been battered, we should not advocate for policies that
operate upon women, rather than at their behest—policies that deprive them of self-determination and of choice.
VI. FROM DOMINANCE TO ANTI-ESSENTIALIST FEMINISM
Mandatory policies reflect the influence of dominance feminism, a
strand of feminism prevalent in the 1980s and 90s, the same time
that domestic violence law and policy was being created and implemented. Dominance feminists, led by Catherine MacKinnon, contended that male domination of women in the sexual sphere was the
primary vehicle for the continued subordination of women.250 MacKinnon argued that “our male-dominated society, aided by maledominated laws, had constructed women as sexual objects for the use
of men.”251 Using this theory, dominance feminists cast the unwillingness of the law to confront issues of sexual harassment and rape
as the manifestation of male assertions of dominion over the sexuality of women.252 Most notoriously, MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin
used dominance feminist theory to argue that pornography should be
outlawed, contending that pornography was the eroticization of male
domination and therefore a key contributor to women’s subordination
within society.253
Mandatory arrest, no-drop prosecution, and policies banning mediation are consistent with a dominance feminist view of the law.
Dominance feminism facilitated the enactment of mandatory policies
by suggesting that by virtue of their subordinated status, women
were incapable of making rational choices in the face of abuse and instead were in need of the substituted judgment of the legal system.254
Such policies fail to acknowledge that women can be battered and
nonetheless be actors with the ability to determine the course of their
250. MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 53 (2003).
251. Id. at 54.
252. Id. at 54-55.
253. Id. at 59.
254. Id. at 53 (citing dominance feminists’ reliance on the state to achieve feminist
goals); Daniels, supra note 167, at 1. The irony, of course, is that in turning to the state for
assistance, women who have been battered are then forced to rely on male-dominated,
male-defined agencies to protect them from male domination. Sparks, supra note 5, at 38.
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lives.255 Dominance feminism provided an ideological justification for
domestic violence policies that stereotyped all women who had been
battered as a particular type of victim, denied them agency, and dictated what their response to the violence should be.256
Critics of dominance feminism have given it a different label: victim feminism.257 Dominance feminism rests upon the idea that every
woman is a victim or a potential victim of male subordination, acted
upon rather than acting.258 That perspective has been challenged by a
new wave of feminist theorists who argue that the experiences of individual women, rather than a stereotyped “universal” woman or victim, must be at the center of feminist theorizing and policymaking.259
Anti-essentialist feminists argue that there is no unitary women’s
experience; the experiences of black women may be vastly different
than those of white women, for example, or those of poor women distinct from those with greater means.260
The attempt to shoehorn all women’s experiences into that of the
über-woman, anti-essentialist feminists contend, has privileged the
experiences of white, middle class, straight women over those of others.261 Anti-essentialists argue that we must instead see women at
the intersections of the various identities that construct them: race,
sexual orientation, class, disability, and any other characteristic that
shapes the woman.262 Only then can policies be responsive to the
needs of all women. While some have argued that third-wave feminism is pre-legal,263 anti-essentialism may, in fact, be the legal manife255. Martha R. Mahoney, Victimization or Oppression? Women’s Lives, Violence, and
Agency, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE: THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC
ABUSE 59, 64 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994).
256. As Janet Halley argues, “While feminism is committed to affirming and identifying itself with female injury, it may thereby, unintentionally, intensify it. Oddly,
representing women as end points of pain, imagining them as lacking the agency to cause
harm to others and particularly to harm men, feminists refuse also to see women—even injured ones—as powerful actors. Feminism objectifies women, feminism erases their agency—could that be right?” JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A
BREAK FROM FEMINISM 346 (2006).
257. JUDITH A. BAER, OUR LIVES BEFORE THE LAW: CONSTRUCTING A FEMINIST
JURISPRUDENCE 59 (1999) (citing Nadine Strossen).
258. CHAMALLAS, supra note 250, at 53.
259. NANCY LEVIT & ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK, FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: A PRIMER 26
(2006).
260. CHAMALLAS, supra note 250, at 85-86.
261. Coker, supra note 41, at 811-12; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 585 (1990).
262. See generally Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1241-42 (1993).
263. Bridget J. Crawford, Toward a Third-Wave Feminist Legal Theory: Young Women,
Pornography and the Praxis of Pleasure, 14 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 99, 158-59 (2007). Chronologically, third wave feminism refers to the cohort of women too young to have participated in the feminist activism of the 1970s. Id. at 101. The focus of third wave feminist activity is diverse, encompassing activism around female sexuality, economic mobility, and
the multifaceted nature of women’s identities. Id. at 102. Third wave feminists take a
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station of third-wave feminism, embracing third-wave feminism’s rejection of early versions of feminist theory and focusing on the “multiple nature of personal identity.”264
Mandatory policies in cases involving domestic violence are inconsistent with anti-essentialist feminism. Mandatory policies assume
that all women who have been battered are “victims,” stereotyping
them as meek, afraid, and easily manipulated and controlled, rather
than seeing the complexity of and differences among them.265 These
policies deny women the ability to define themselves, distilling every
woman down to the stereotypical victim in need of the system’s protection, unable to make rational choices. Mandatory policies ignore
that women experiencing violence may have multiple goals, assuming instead that all women prioritize safety and accountability.
Defining all women as victims allowed the legal system to narrow
the available options, depriving women who had been battered of the
ability to pursue possibilities beyond the range of those deemed acceptable by the legal system. Anti-essentialist feminism requires that
women who have been battered be treated as individuals with different identities and capacities, and that they be given the opportunity
to make choices consistent with their own goals and priorities. In a
third-wave feminist world, women who have been battered should
not be told by the state that they have no choice about arrest, prosecution, or mediation.266 Instead, domestic violence law and policy
should respect the rights of individual women to choose whether and
how to use the criminal and civil legal systems.267 Such a shift would
be consistent both with anti-essentialist feminist theory and with the
focus on autonomy and agency that characterized the early battered
women’s movement.
Critics of anti-essentialist feminism have argued that its focus on
the individual creates a fragmentation of interests that can render
policymaking impossible.268 But focusing on an individual’s autonomy—her right to make her own decisions—creates a clear path for
broad view of women’s issues, capturing everything from human rights to ecofeminism to
anticorporate activism. Niamh Moore, Imagining Feminist Futures: The Third Wave, Postfeminism, and Eco/feminism, in THIRD WAVE FEMINISM: A CRITICAL EXPLORATION 137
(Stacy Gillis, Gillian Howie & Rebecca Munford eds., 2d ed. 2007).
264. Id. at 118-19. My thanks to Professor Margaret E. Johnson for this argument.
265. See generally Goodmark, supra note 221, at 75.
266. As Beth Kiyoko Jamieson writes, “Exerting control over the victimized is not an
appropriate feminist solution.” JAMIESON, supra note 142, at 220.
267. Id. at 227 (“It is better, ethically and politically, that women decide individually
how best to lead our lives rather than that women as a group lead the best life. Even the
best choice is compromised if it is not selected by an individual deciding for herself. And it
is better to make our own choices than to be directed to a single correct choice.”).
268. See, e.g., Leslie Friedman Goldstein, Can This Marriage Be Saved? Feminist Public Policy and Feminist Jurisprudence, in FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: THE DIFFERENCE
DEBATE 11, 29 (Leslie Friedman Goldstein ed., 1997).
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policymakers. Domestic violence law and policy should not act on individuals, but rather should be available to be deployed by them as
they see fit. Domestic violence law and policy need not address each
individual’s personal concerns; it need only give her the ability to
choose whether, when, and how to utilize tools like arrest, prosecution, and mediation. Creating space for choice honors the differences
between women, recognizing that race, class, sexual orientation, disability status, and a multiplicity of other variables color how a particular woman might want to respond to a particular incidence of violence at a particular moment in time. Enabling women who have
been battered to decide how they will engage with the legal system
respects their autonomy and agency and allows individual women to
craft the solutions that they perceive are most likely to meet their
goals, whether those goals are safety, accountability, economic stability, or maintenance of their intimate relationships.
The choices made by women who have been battered will certainly
have consequences, sometimes overwhelmingly negative consequences.269 Some women who choose not to have their partners arrested will be battered again; some will die.270 Some offenders will be
free to abuse again as a result of dismissed prosecutions. Some women will strike bad deals in mediation or experience revictimization in
the process. Creating space for individuals to exercise their ability to
choose, regardless of the outcomes of those choices, is a hallmark of
autonomy. But many other women will be empowered by the ability
to make these choices for themselves in the contexts of their own
lives, rather than having the legal system impose decisions upon
them based on what they “should” want. If empowerment is still the
goal of the battered women’s movement, we must accept that women
who have been battered have the right to make choices that we might
disagree with, dislike, or fear.271
Although many of the advocates who originally endorsed them
have come to question mandatory policies,272 that reevaluation may
269. As Mary Ann Dutton notes, with the recognition that women who have been battered must have the freedom to make choices comes the responsibility for the consequences
of those choices. DUTTON, supra note 61, at 116.
270. Sue Carlton, Why Do We Hear This Story So Often?, ST. PETERSBURG (FLORIDA)
TIMES, Apr. 14, 2009, at 1B (describing the death of Jennifer Johnson, who called the police
about her abusive boyfriend eleven times but dropped the charges each time; the twelfth
call she made was from the trunk of a car, after which she was found dead); see also Milton
J. Valencia & John R. Ellement, Slain Woman Was Too Afraid to Aid Prosecution, Family
Says, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 9, 2009, at B3.
271. JAMIESON, supra note 142, at 172.
272. Some advocates for women who have been battered remain fierce defenders of
these policies. In a recent issue of the Domestic Violence Report, for example, longtime advocate Joan Zorza defended the use of mandatory arrest and no-drop policies on autonomy
grounds, arguing, “While there is no doubt that the numbers of arrests and prosecutions
has increased greatly, the reality is that notwithstanding what police and prosecutors may
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have come too late. The state, which has embraced these mandatory
policies, has very different goals for its interventions than advocates
do. The state has put substantial resources behind policies like mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution,273 and an entire generation of
police and prosecutors has been schooled in both the theory underlying these policies and the techniques for instituting them.274 Similarly, mediation bans are enshrined in state law and policy.275 Mediators
and judges are trained to screen domestic violence cases out of mediation,276 and advocates hold tight to their belief that mediation is
harmful for all women who have been battered.277
Mandatory interventions, particularly in the criminal justice system, are the rule, not the exception, and new mandatory interventions are being proposed to address perceived shortcomings in the
system.278 Changing the legal system’s culture to foster autonomy for
women who have been battered will be significantly more difficult
than getting the legal system to embrace those changes in the first
instance. The experience with mandatory policies should serve as a
cautionary tale, though, prompting advocates and policy makers to
think carefully before enacting laws and policies that bind all women
who have been battered, notwithstanding those women’s own goals,
beliefs, choices, and situations. Mandatory interventions in cases insay, in no jurisdiction do police arrest batterers in every DV case, nor do police prosecute
batterers in every case. But what is true, is that victims have less control over whether
they can prevent their abuser from being arrested or prosecuted. What has changed is that
in the past, they had almost no control over whether they could force an arrest or prosecution.” Joan Zorza, Empowering Battered Women by Expanding Their Options: Part II,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REPORT, October/November 2008, at 3.
273. The fiscal year 2007 budget included appropriations of $157 million for STOP
grants and $62 million for Grants to Encourage Arrest. See CAMPAIGN FOR FUNDING TO
END DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE: VAWA APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 2006
AND 2007, AND FISCAL YEAR 2008 REQUESTS (2007), available at http://www.naesv.org/
Resources/approps102707.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2009).
274. As Eve and Carl Buzawa recognized about mandatory arrest policies in 1992, “To
this extent, the new response that explicitly favors arrest has, in the unprecedented span
of five or six years, achieved a new orthodoxy, at least among the federal government and
policy elites.” Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 243, at xiii.
275. In both Maryland and New Jersey, for example, although the law does not seem to
explicitly forbid mediation in domestic violence cases, the policy has been to prohibit mediators from handling cases involving domestic violence.
276. In Maryland, advocates for women who had been battered teamed with law professors to create a training video (featuring me as the victim) designed to teach judges and
mediators how to screen out cases involving domestic violence.
277. A recent discussion on a listserv populated by advocates for women who have been
battered is illustrative. The posts began from the position that mediation was unequivocally problematic in cases involving domestic violence; only after a few dissenters began to
post was a more nuanced conversation about whether and how mediation should occur in
cases involving domestic violence possible.
278. See, e.g., Jennifer R. Adler, Strengthening Victims’ Rights in Domestic Violence
Cases: An Argument for 30-Day Mandatory Restraining Orders in Massachusetts, 8 B.U.
PUB. INT. L.J. 303, 314-16 (1999) (citing approvingly Colorado’s mandatory restraining order law and advocating for such laws in Massachusetts).
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volving domestic violence are a second-wave relic that feminists
should shed as we move into a third-wave world.
VII. CONCLUSION
Barbara Hart has argued that
Agency is the power to make informed decisions and implement
them without interference by the batterer. Agency is the power to
organize one’s life. Agency is the power to establish stable, nurturing homes for children. Agency is the power to participate, without
batterer impediment, in work, education, faith, family and community . . . . Agency is the power to employ the legal options, community resources, economic remedies, housing opportunities, and
educational programs available in order to escape the violence and
achieve lives that are free of intimidation, degradation, and violation.279

But agency is also the power to choose not to have an intimate partner arrested. Agency is the power to choose not to participate in a
prosecution that could cause an intimate partner to go to jail or be
deported or simply be removed from the family. Agency is the power
to confront an intimate partner with his violence and advocate on
one’s own behalf for a mediated settlement to pending litigation.
Agency is the power to see a physician to have injuries treated but
choose to have that physician maintain confidentiality about the
cause of those injuries. Agency is self-direction, self-determination,
and the ability to identify, evaluate, and make decisions. Agency and
autonomy are what women who have been battered are denied by
mandatory policies in cases involving domestic violence. Antiessentialist feminist policymaking should turn away from the mandatory policies of the past and embrace policies that empower women
who want to be seen as individuals, agents, and actors—not as victims. A third-wave feminist vision of the world demands no less.

279. Hart, supra note 13, at 209.

